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The Bicentennial of the Jurisprudence
of Original Intent: The Recent Past
Boris I. Bittkert
The Bicentennial of the Jurisprudence of Original Intent, celebrated
in 1996-less than one decade after the Bicentennial of the Constitution,
launched a tidal wave of litigation. This wave as yet shows no signs of
reaching its crest, let alone receding. An account of the bewildering
events touched off by the so-called "Second Bicentennial" may be of
interest to the readers of this journal, even though this account may
become outdated almost immediately.1
I
THE BACKGROUND OF THE "SECOND BICENTENNIAL"
As every schoolchild knows, 1996 was the Bicentennial of the Juris-
prudence of Original Intent because the Supreme Court first used the
phrase "intention of the framers" in 1796, when it announced in Hylton
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1. I had hoped to embellish this exposition with a full scholarly gloss, but to insure prompt
publication, I was forced to confine myself to a bare bones description of the events with only a few
explanatory and illustrative footnotes. For the same reason, I completed the manuscript before
certain events described below occurred. While this may not exonerate me from responsibility for
factual errors, I hope that readers will take my haste into account in mitigation of sentence.
I apologize to my colleagues and fellow workers in the constitutional law vineyard for
submitting this Article for publication before vetting it with them. My academic habits were fully
formed before the custom of vetting manuscripts with everyone in sight began. Indeed, I entered
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the other hand, should the reader find any merits herein, they need not be credited to the author's
colleagues.
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v. United States2 that "[it was... obviously the intention of the framers
of the Constitution, that Congress should possess full power over every
species of taxable property, except exports. The term taxes, is generical,
and was made use of to vest in Congress plenary authority in all cases of
taxation."
3
Mighty oaks from little acorns grow. In 1895, exactly ninety-nine
years after deciding Hylton, the Supreme Court invoked the intent of the
framers more than forty times in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 4
which held that the federal income tax of 1894 was unconstitutional, thus
forestalling what Justice Field feared: "a war of the poor against the rich;
a war constantly growing in intensity and bitterness."5 With this demon-
stration of the framers' foresight fresh in mind, the nation might have
been expected to celebrate the one hundredth birthday of the Jurispru-
dence of Original Intent in 1896. But its centennial came and went with-
out, so far as the author can determine, any public recognition.
Perhaps the explanation for this curious inattention to an important
anniversary lies in the relationship between the Hylton and Pollock cases.
Recall that the Hylton case unequivocally asserted that the framers
intended "to vest in Congress plenary authority in all cases of taxation."6
Pollock, by contrast, held that Congress could not tax the interest derived
from state and municipal bonds.7 Thus, any 1896 festivities marking the
Centennial of the Jurisprudence of Original Intent would have been
marred by the unsettling realization, whether avowed or suppressed, that
the Hylton case had inaugurated ninety-nine years of error and that Pol-
lock's correction was only a year old. In retrospect, therefore, we can
acknowledge that it was just as well that the occasion was protected by a
veil of obscurity.
The second centennial of the Jurisprudence of Original Intent, how-
ever, was something else again. For one thing, the conflict between Hyl-
ton and Pollock that in 1896 may have cast a pall over the first centennial
was mitigated in 1988 by South Carolina v. Baker, I in which the
Supreme Court announced that the federal government can tax interest
derived from state and municipal bonds, thus repudiating Pollock and
2. 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 171 (1796).
3. Id at 176 (seriatim) (opinion of Paterson, J.); see also id. at 174 (seriatim) (opinion of
Chase, J.) (Congress has power "to lay and collect taxes, of every kind or nature, without any
restraint [save for the uniformity and apportionment rules], except only on exports.") (emphasis in
original).
4. 157 U.S. 429 (1895) (41 references to the intent of the framers by prevailing and dissenting
justices), modified, 158 U.S. 601 (1895), overruled, 108 S.Ct. 1355 (1988).
5. Id at 607 (Field, J., concurring).
6. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 176 (seriatim) (opinion of Paterson, J.).
7. Pollock 157 U.S. at 585-86.
8. 108 S. Ct. 1355 (1988).
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rehabilitating Hylton.9 It became possible, therefore, to commemorate
Hylton without conceding that its luster had been tarnished by Pollock.
The importance of original intent was highlighted by its role in the
most important case of this century, Brown v. Board of Education.'0
After hearing argument, the Supreme Court assigned the case for reargu-
ment, requesting counsel "to discuss particularly" questions relating to
"the understanding of the framers" of the fourteenth amendment' -a
request that generated a vast historical record. Although the Court ulti-
mately concluded that this compilation of evidence was "not enough to
resolve the problem with which [the Justices were] faced,"' 2 its system-
atic and comprehensive character contrasted sharply with the impres-
sionistic accounts of the framers' intentions that passed muster during
the preceding 150 years, and it set an example for subsequent inquiries.
A vast body of scholarly research, giving the Jurisprudence of Origi-
nal Intent a systematic intellectual foundation that it had previously
lacked, both fostered and buttressed judicial attention to the intent of the
framers during the fifty years preceding the Bicentennial.' 3 Primus inter
pares was William W. Crosskey's 1953 work Politics and the Constitution
in the History of the United States, which rejected the "sophistries" of the
"living-document" school of constitutional law in favor of the Constitu-
tion's "true and intended meaning."' 4 To arm himself and his readers
"with a specialized dictionary of the eighteenth-century word-usages,
and political and legal ideas, which are needed for a true understanding
of the Constitution,"' 5 Crosskey ransacked a daunting array of contem-
poraneous dictionaries, treatises, legal decisions, political pamphlets, and
newspapers. He used the resulting custom-tailored lexicon to examine
what his first chapter calls "Our Unknown Constitution." This erudite
research led him to announce a series of unorthodox, indeed revolution-
ary, propositions about the originally intended meaning of the com-
9. South Carolina v. Baker did not rehabilitate Hylton in full. However "plenary" the federal
power to tax natural persons and corporations may be, it may not allow Congress to tax state and
local governments as such, see id at 1364 n.10, 1367 n.13, and Congress' power to tax foreign
diplomats and events may be constrained by international law and by jurisdictional limits implicit in
the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
10. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
11. Miscellaneous Order, 345 U.S. 972 (1953) (Brown v. Board of Education).
12. Brown, 347 U.S. at 489 ("[Although these sources cast some light, it is not enough to
resolve the problem with which we are faced."); see also Bickel, The Original Understanding and the
Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1955).
13. There were some precursors to these post-World War II works. See, ag., L. BOUDIN,
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1932) and Boudin's earlier article with the same title, 26 POL. ScI. Q.
238 (1911).
14. 2 W. CRossKEY, PoLITcs AND THE CONSTrTUTON IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 1172-73 (1953). Volumes I and 2 were published in 1953. Volume 3, with William Jeffrey,
Jr. as coauthor, was published in 1980, after Crosskey's death.
15. 1 id atS.
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merce, imports and exports, ex post facto, contracts, and general welfare
clauses of the Constitution, as well as about the authority originally
intended to be vested in the President and the federal courts. 6
Crosskey's massive and unremitting search for the Constitution's
"true and intended meaning" was followed by Raoul Berger's spate of
book-length monographs, which systematically reexamined a variety of
specific constitutional provisions in light of the intent of the framers.1 7
Like Crosskey, Berger awarded a stamp of disapproval to almost every
currently accepted constitutional interpretation that engaged his
attention. 18
16. For a sampling of the diverse reactions to Crosskey's work, compare Clark, Professor
Crosskey and the Brooding Omnipresence of Erie-Tompkins, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 24, 24 (1953) ("a
major scholastic effort of ourtimes") and Hamilton, The Constitution-Apropos of Crosskey, 21 U.
Cm. L. REV. 79, 92 (1953) ("Never has so adequate a gloss-fashioned from materials from a
hundred sources--been written to an authoritative text.") with Brown, Book Review, 67 HARV. L.
REv. 1439, 1456 (1954) ("insistent advocacy of the ideefxe, which must either mold to its purpose,
or simply reject, all that it touches"); Fairman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutional
Limitations on State GovernmentalAuthority, 21 U. CHII. L. REv. 40, 78 ("not candid and objective
... should be viewed with the greatest skepticism and reserve") and Goebel, Ex Parte Clio, 54
COLUM. L. REv. 450, 451 (1954) ("[M]easured by even the least exacting of scholarly standards,
[the work] is in the reviewers opinion without merit"). See also C. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE USES OF HISTORY 156 n.14 (1969):
Almost no reviewer of the work, regardless of his position on Crosskey's historical
arguments (or policy goals), dared to follow the author's leap across the historical chasm
and agree that more than a century and a half of constitutional development should be
repealed on the basis of new discoveries as to the original meaning of the constitutional
document.
17. See, eg., R. BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES: THE SUPREME COURT'S OBSTACLE COURSE
(1982) [hereinafter R. BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES]; R. BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A
CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH (1974); R. BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN (1987)
[hereinafter R. BERGER, FEDERALISM]; R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977) [hereinafter R. BERGER,
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY].
At first blush, Berger's basic hermeneutic principle (that the intent of the framers is controlling)
might be thought to differ from that of Crosskey. Crosskey repeatedly announced his agreement
with Holmes that "we ask, not what this man meant, but what those words would mean in the
mouth of a normal speaker of English, using them in the circumstances in which they were used."
Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417-18 (1899). Crosskey drives
home his allegiance to this principle by quoting it on the title page of both volumes one and two of
his work. W. CROSSKEY, supra note 14. Any divergence between Berger and Crosskey-Holmes,
however, is merely superficial. Berger never suggests that the framers expressed their intent
(whether in drafting or in explaining the Constitution) in words having an idiosyncratic meaning,
rather than the meaning they would have "in the mouth of a normal speaker of English." Berger,
Judicial Review: Countercriticism in Tranquility, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 390, 393-97 (1974). Berger also
rejects the framers' "secret beliefs" and favors what they said publicly. See id. at 393-97.
18. Berger also resembled Crosskey in eliciting passionate admirers and equally passionate
critics. Compare Hurst, Book Review, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 643, 650 (1973) ("historical
craftsmanship of a high order, examining events with scrupulous care") and Nathanson, Book
Review, 2 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 209, 218 (1974) ("finest background available") with Sofaer, Book
Review, 88 HARV. L. REV. 281, 284 (1974) ("tendency to assume an advocate's role and present a
wholly one-sided, and therefore misleading, picture of the issues he discusses") and Winter, The
Seedlings for the Forest (Book Review), 83 YALE L.J. 1730, 1744 (1974) ("a cramped,
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The achievements of these full-time practitioners of the Jurispru-
dence of Original Intent inspired an army of part-timers to explore every
nook and cranny of the Constitution for evidence that an imperial judici-
ary had subverted the intent of the framers. 19 In their enthusiastic icon-
oclasm, they were spurred on by the movement's grand theoreticians, of
whom none was more eloquent than Robert Bork. In 1990, making the
most of his judicial and academic experience, he published a reasoned
and eloquent manifesto, entitled Original Intent: Our Last Best Hope,
which Publishers' Hebdomonal Journal described as "this year's most
seductive non-fiction page-turner," daringly predicting that it would out-
sell Charles Reich's The Greening of America.2 o
Though it is too early to compare sales figures, it is already clear
that Bork, like Reich, managed to describe, accelerate, and legitimate a
powerful intellectual wave while joyfully riding its crest. Moreover,
Bork's work appeared just as Academe's enchantment with noninterpre-
tivism was drawing to a close. Noninterpretivism, which did not even
purport to "interpret" the language of the Constitution, was the victim of
its own success. By creating a "living constitution," it had recognized
more and more constitutional options, while closing off none.
As these uncertainties increased exponentially, student tolerance of
ambiguity, never robust, diminished in inverse proportion. Indeed, stu-
dents at several law schools, whose faculties claimed to constitute homo-
geneous "interpretive communities," demanded that a "student anxiety
impact statement" be issued whenever an exponent of noninterpretivism
was under consideration for an academic appointment. For their part,
faculties began to blame noninterpretivism for a mixed grill of academic
disorders: classroom lassitude, cynicism, grade inflation, indifference to
public service opportunities, and the hiding of library books just before
examinations. The coup de grace for this previously promising intellec-
tual movement was delivered at the December 1995 convention of the
American Association of Law Schools. A symposium entitled Who
Reads Derrida Today? was attended only by the speakers. On learning
that the members of the AALS had answered the symposium's rhetorical
question with their feet, a renowned sociologist of knowledge announced
that "the juices of noninterpretivism have dried up, and its seeds won't
unidimensional view of constitutional law"). See also Kurland, Foreword to R. BERGER, SELECTED
WRITINGS ON THE CONSTrruTON at i (1987) ("Raoul Berger is the dean of scholars of the
American Constitution.").
19. For a representative sample of these specialized studies, see Bernstein, Charting the
Bicentennial, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1565, 1599 n.194 (1987).
20. PUBLISHERS' HEBDOMONAL J., Apr. 1, 1990, at 1. In the jargon of the trade, "page-
turner" is the superlative of "good read" and "better read." Bork's views were presaged by his
article, entitled Judicial Review and Democracy, in 3 L. LEVY, K. KARST, & D. MAHONEY,
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1061 (1986).
19891
HeinOnline -- 77 Cal. L. Rev. 239 1989
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
produce any new shoots for at least fifty years." She added that in the
meantime, the Jurisprudence of Original Intent "will undoubtedly reign
in solitary splendor."
II
THE PIONEERING ORIGINAL INTENT CASES
A. The Interstate Monopoly Case
In 1997, just one year after the Bicentennial of the Jurisprudence of
Original Intent ended, a federal district court applied the doctrine in one
of the most dramatic lawsuits of our day, the justly famous Interstate
Monopoly Case. The case involved the Sherman Antitrust Act, which,
save for a passing episode,2 had been thought to fall snugly within the
jurisdiction over interstate commerce allocated to Congress by article I,
section 8 of the Constitution. After enjoying its charmed life for more
than a century, the Sherman Act was held unconstitutional in the Inter-
state Monopoly Case. The weapon of death was a judgment n.o.v., after a
jury found a ring of conglomerateurs (a/k/a economic royalists) guilty of
conspiring to monopolize all interstate business by bringing under a sin-
gle corporate umbrella every commercial enterprise in the country, save
for so-called mom-and-pop stores.
Although more than one hundred of the country's largest law firms
participated in defending the case, not one had thought to interpose a
constitutional objection to the prosecution until the district judge asked
for briefs on "the relevance of the intent of the framers to the constitu-
tionality of the Sherman Act." Even then, the court's request baffled the
lawyers until a paralegal in one of the firms, working to finance his grad-
uate studies in American history, recalled that a primary task of the Phil-
adelphia Convention of 1787 was to eliminate obstructions to interstate
commerce that states imposed on each other. "Could it be," this humble
(but, as it turned out, perceptive) graduate student asked the senior asso-
ciate to whom he reported, "that the framers intended to confine the
federal government's power to regulate interstate commerce to the mis-
chief it was meant to remedy-internecine exactions by the states them-
selves-and to exclude private behavior?"
The paralegal's electrifying question shocked the defense lawyers
into vigorous action. Within twenty-four hours, a state-of-the-art com-
puter was programmed to compile every scrap of evidence bearing on the
intended scope of the commerce clause that could be found by a quickly
21. See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1894) (Manufacturing is not
"commerce."). For the decline and fall of the EC Knight doctrine, see, for example, Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST
LAW, 231-233 (1978).
[Vol. 77:235
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mustered regiment of American historians. This electronic data base was
then subjected to the most exacting search in the history of American
law, which confirmed a leading commentator's conclusion that "the all
but exclusive domestic concern of the Founders was exactions by States
from their neighbors."22 This statement, according to the computer,
could be improved upon only by excising the words "all but." In short,
in drafting and ratifying the commerce clause, the framers and founders
intended the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce to
encompass only "exactions by sister States,"23 not the conduct of private
entrepreneurs.
Having conclusively established the intent of the framers, the court
in the Interstate Monopoly Case moved swiftly to judgment. Relying on
the "centuries-old rule of interpretation [that] an enactment is to be con-
strued in light of the evil it was designed to remedy"'24 and not as a rov-
ing commission to cure the world's ills, the judge announced that the
Sherman Act, tested by the Jurisprudence of Original Intent, was an
unconstitutional usurpation of power by Congress.
In so ruling, the court noted that the government, seeking to vali-
date the legislation, relied heavily on the fact that Professor Bork (as he
was then), a widely acclaimed authority on the Jurisprudence of Original
Intent, had written extensively about the Sherman Act without ever inti-
mating that it was unconstitutional.25 The court, however, rejected the
claim that this failure to condemn the Act was tantamount to a clean bill
of health, since Professor Bork had never unequivocally asserted that the
legislation was constitutional. When a scholarly work does not discuss
22. R. BERGER, FEDERALISM, supra note 17, at 128 (emphasis added); see also Case of the
State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232, 275 (1872) ("A power to prevent embarrassing restrictions
by any State was the thing desired" by the framers.) (emphasis added); R. BERGER, FEDERALISM,
supra note 17, at 130 ("reasonable to infer" that for 44 years after adoption of Constitution, no
purpose for federal interstate commerce power had been thought of, other than "relief of the States
which import and export through other States, from the levy of improper contributions by the
latter") (quoting 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTrrUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 1066, at 10 (5th ed. 1905)) (emphasis added).
23. R. BERGER, FEDERALISM, supra note 17, at 133.
24. Id. at 128.
25. See, eg., K. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978); Bork, Legislative Intent and the
Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7 (1966). Curiously, Senator Sherman expressed doubts
about the constitutionality of the legislation that ultimately, but perhaps unjustly, bore his name.
When the legislation was about to be referred to the Senate Finance Committee, Sherman remarked:
I have myself given some attention to it, to see how far it is within the constitutional power
of Congress to prohibit trusts and combinations in restraint of trade. It is very clear there
is no such power unless it is derived from the power of levying taxes; that it is a power
which must be exercised by each State for itself ... Whether such legislation can be
ingrafted in our peculiar system of government by the national authority, there is some
doubt. If it can be done at all, it must be done upon a tariff bill or upon a revenue bill. I do
not see in what other way it can be done.
CONG. REc. 7513 (1888). See generally H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRusr POLICY 164-210
(1954).
19891
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an issue, the judge concluded, it is best to eschew inferences drawn from
what might have been, but was not, said. In this respect, she asserted,
scholarly treatises should be accorded the same treatment that Justice
Holmes recommended for judicial opinions: "Questions which merely
lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled
upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute
precedents."26
Finally, the court acknowledged that the commerce clause, in
empowering Congress "[t]o regulate commerce.., among the several
States,"'27 contains no explicit internal lexical limit on the verb "to regu-
late." The prosecution argued that the power must therefore be plenary,
and that restricting its scope to state obstructions of interstate commerce
was tantamount to rewriting the constitutional language to read "to reg-
ulate [state action interfering with interstate] commerce." The judge
simply responded by quoting a central tenet of the Jurisprudence of Orig-
inal Intent: "'The intention of the lawmaker is the law,' rising above
even the text."'28 To illustrate the antiquity of this principle, the judge
quoted the Commandment "Thou shalt not kill," pointing out that in
accordance with the Supreme Law-Giver's intent, this seemingly unlim-
ited prohibition is almost universally interpreted to exempt soldiers,
policemen, and public hangmen when acting in an official capacity.
After announcing her decision, the judge in the Interstate Monopoly
Case refused to speak with reporters. Her reticence, however, did not
deter her law school roommate, who was also her husband and former
partner in the practice of law, from making himself available to the press.
Speaking from the courthouse steps, he responded to a reporter's ques-
tions as follows:
Q. Counselor, perhaps your long association with the judge in the
Interstate Monopoly Case will enable you to solve a puzzle for us.
A. I'll try. What's the puzzle?
Q. Well, as you know, the judge was an active member of the
American Civil Liberties Union from her law school days until she
26. Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925).
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
28. PL BERGER, FEDERALISM, supra note 17, at 15-16 (quoting Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S.
197, 212 (1903) (quoting Smythe v. Fiske, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 374, 380 (1874))). The judge added
that Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 227 (1899) (upholding the Sherman
Act's constitutionality against a claim that the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce
does not encompass the power "to interfere with or prohibit private contracts between citizens, even
though such contracts have interstate commerce for their object, and result in a direct and
substantial obstruction to or regulation of that commerce") took the words of the Constitution as
controlling, id at 229 ("we fail to find in the language of the grant any such limitation"), instead of
interpreting the language, as required by the Jurisprudence of Original Intent, in harmony with the
framers' intent.
[Vol. 77:235
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became a judge. She then resigned, stating, as I recall, that she feared
that continued membership might create an impression of impropriety.
Now people are puzzled that someone with an ACLU background
should embrace, and apply, the Jurisprudence of Original Intent.
A. Her ACLU membership is not the puzzle; it's the answer.
Q. Would you explain?
A. Have you ever been a member of the ACLU?
Q. No, but ....
A. Well, I have, and for forty years. In all that time, I don't think
I ever received an ACLU appeal for funds that did not warn us that
enemies of the Constitution were subverting the framers' intent. The
ACLU, to my certain knowledge, often made the same point in its briefs.
In fact, when years ago I first heard Attorney General Meese expound
the Jurisprudence of Original Intent, I wondered if he was acting as an
ACLU mole in President Reagan's Department of Justice.
Q. Surely you were disabused of that notion quite soon.
A. Yes, but I was so worried about the confusion resulting from
the simultaneous invocation of the Jurisprudence of Original Intent by
the ACLU and the Department of Justice2 9 that I wrote to the chairman
of the ACLU, suggesting that he investigate whether the ACLU had a
common law copyright on the term "original intent" so the principle
could be protected against exploitation by the ACLU's enemies. Alas, he
did not reply.
Q. Counselor, your last remarks were fascinating, but could we
return to the judge?
A. Of course.
Q. Some lawyers are saying that the judge's decision, if upheld on
appeal, means the end of the National Labor Relations Board, federal
minimum wage legislation, and a host of other social programs that,
according to our information, the judge vigorously favored when she was
in practice. Are these suppositions true?
A. First, as to the impact of the decision, I agree that its conclu-
sion goes far beyond the Sherman Act, and that it jeopardizes lots of
federal programs that were enacted in reliance on Congress' power to
regulate private enterprises engaged in interstate commerce. Second, as
to the judge's reaction, I can't speak for her, but in my experience, when
she is gripped by a principle, she doesn't care where the chips fall. She is
not result oriented. In applying the Jurisprudence of Original Intent, she
will undoubtedly be guided by the principle, fiat intentio, ruat coelum.
29. Sometimes the confusion seems to be internalized. See, eg., Goldberg, Attorney General
Meese vs Chief Justice John Marshall and Justice Hugo L. Black, 38 ALA. L. REv. 237 (1987)
Former Justice Goldberg criticized Attorney General Mise because his "simplistic invocation of
the Founding Fathers' intention does injustice to their vision and grand design in framing our
fundamental law", id at 240, while praising Justice Black for his reliance on history in supporting
his incorporation theory of the fourteenth amendment, id. at 240-44.
1989]
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B. The Alaska Toxics Case
In the same year that the Interstate Monopoly Case was decided, a
coalition of Alaskan public health and environmental groups, restive at
what they regarded as the federal government's slow pace in regulating
toxic substances, managed to gain control of their state's legislature.
Their political campaign drew heavily on the vision of a revitalized dual
federalism that was so popular in 1987 during the Constitution's bicen-
tennial.30 The first fruit of this electoral success, discharging with a ven-
geance the coalition's promise to "put the 'govern' back into state
government," was a statute forbidding the shipment of toxic chemicals
anywhere within the state by land transportation, except under a permit
granted by the state's environmental and public health agency. More-
over, cities and other political subdivisions of the state were authorized
to establish local agencies, which could impose even stricter limitations
on the use of local roads for transporting toxic chemicals. Acknowledg-
ing the federal government's control over the nation's navigable waters,
however, the act exempted water transportation, thus permitting toxic
chemicals to be paraded up and down Alaska's waterways so long as they
were not unloaded without a state or local permit.
Since all transportation of toxic chemicals, in Alaska and elsewhere
in the United States, whether by land, air, or water, was conducted under
permits granted by federal government agencies, the chemical manufac-
turers did not initially take the state act seriously. But rather than
merely ignoring it, they sued to restrain enforcement in the federal dis-
trict court for Alaska. On the first day of trial, their lead counsel
mounted the courthouse steps accompanied by four paralegals carrying
bushel baskets of federal permits and a banner emblazoned with the
words: "The Laws of the United States Are the Supreme Law of the
Land.""1 A bystander was heard to observe, "Yes, but only if they are
made in pursuance of the Constitution." That comment, as related
below, proved to be prescient.
After hearing argument, the court refused to invalidate the Alaska
legislation, despite the elaborate federal regulatory and permit schemes
that, according to the chemical manufacturers, preempted the field. Not-
ing that the case was certain to be appealed and that, whether affirmed or
reversed, any written opinion by him would be quickly forgotten, the
30. For the leading scholarly, as distinguished from inspirational and rhetorical, support for a
revival of dual federalism, see R. BERGER, FEDERALISM, supra note 17.
31. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.").
[Vol. 77:235
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judge delivered an oral opinion. Stripped of details, his remarks can be
summarized as follows:
1. Alaska's Police Power
The legislation, embodying a reasonable method of protecting the
health of its citizens, was a valid exercise of Alaska's "police power."
This type of legislation was recognized as reserved to the states as early
as 1824 when Chief Justice Marshall, despite his nationalist view of the
Constitution, spoke of "[t]he acknowledged power of a State to regulate
its police."' 32 This power encompassed the "immense mass of legislation
... not surrendered to the general government," including "[i]nspection
laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every description, as well as laws
... which respect turnpike roads, ferries, etc." 33 In 1837, the Supreme
Court, per Justice Barbour, in harmony with the intent of the framers,
stated that "the authority of a State is complete, unqualified, and exclu-
sive" when it exercises "those powers which relate to merely municipal
legislation, or what may, perhaps, more properly be called internal
police. ,34
To illustrate the broad scope of this "complete, unqualified, and
exclusive" authority, the judge in the Alaska Toxics case quoted Justice
Barbour's authoritative description of the state's reserved police power:
If we were to attempt [a definition], we should say, that every law
came within this description which concerned the welfare of the whole
people of a state, or any individual within it; whether related to their
rights, or their duties; whether it respected them as men, or as citizens of
the state; whether in their public or private relations; whether it related
to the rights of persons, or of property, of the whole people of a state, or
of any individual within it; and whose operation was within the territorial
limits of the state, and upon the persons and things within its
jurisdiction.35
The judge noted plaintiff's argument that a judgment in favor of the
Alaska statute would prevent the federal government from reaching into
a state's interior to cope with epidemics and infectious diseases, and
would even allow each state to make its own pure food and drug law.
32. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 208 (1824). Marshall was, of course, using the
term "police" in its early sense, rather akin to "internal policy," not in its narrower modem
connotation of a governmental force charged with maintaining law and order. See generally infra
note 35.
33. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 203.
34. Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 139 (1837) (emphasis in original). For
additional references to the exclusive nature of the state's police power, see R. BERGER,
FEDERALISM, supra note 17, at 142-43.
35. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 139; see also R. BERGER, FEDERALISM, supra note 17, at 67, 71-
76; T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMrrATIONS 1223-27 (1927); E. FREUND, THE POLICE POWER:
PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (1904).
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After stating that these issues were not before him, he observed that if
these assertions were correct, there was no reason to think that the states
would be less solicitous of the health of their citizens than the federal
government, as the legislation before him amply demonstrated. The
judge also stated that the framers had created dual federalism because of
their conviction that the states were more familiar with local problems
than a faraway Congress.
The judge next addressed the argument that the police power was
defined broadly and vaguely in the early days of the Republic, and that if
construed to be exclusive, a state could exercise its police power to invali-
date federal legislation governing national economic institutions such as
banking and insurance. 36 Acknowledging that the state's reserved police
power was indeed "diversified and multifarious,"37 the judge pointed out
that if it were to be curtailed, the proper instrument was an amendment
to the Constitution.
The judge then stated that the Constitution does not delegate to
Congress any authority to supersede the state's police power. He there-
fore concluded that the supremacy clause, which accords precedence to
valid exercises by Congress of its delegated or enumerated powers, had
no bearing on the case before him.3 Borrowing from a comment by
Edmund Pendleton at the Virginia Ratification Convention, the judge
said, "The police powers of the states and the enumerated powers of the
federal government 'can no more clash than two parallel lines can
meet.' "39
2. Federal Supremacy
Assuming arguendo, however, that this conclusion was erroneous
(and that the supremacy clause was directed not merely to state court
judges, but also to the federal judiciary), the judge considered whether
the federal laws regulating the transportation of toxic chemicals were
"made in pursuance" of the Constitution so as to qualify under the
36. This claim was based on the fact that New York statutes of 1829 included a 100-page
compilation of the state's "internal police laws," covering, inter alia, regulations of insurance agents,
stock-jobbing, banking, and pawn-brokering. See 1829 N.Y. Laws.
37. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 139.
38. See R. BERGER, FEDERALISM, supra note 17, at 97 ("Only delegated powers, however,
were made 'supreme'; the Founders meant to protect the States' undelegated powers from federal
intrusion, as Article VI makes quite clear.") (emphasis in original); see also id. at 70 n.109.
39. G. WooD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 529 (1969); see
also R. BERGER, FEDERALISM, supra note 17, at 140:
The Founders' anxiety to safeguard the States' police powers-protection of the
health, safety, and morals of their citizens-from federal "intermeddling" is well
documented. It should require more than the colorless "commerce among the several
States" to demonstrate their intention sub silentio to act in derogation of assurances to
allay such fears. (footnote omitted).
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supremacy clause for precedence over the Alaska legislation.4' On turn-
ing his attention to this issue, the judge conceded that at first blush, the
federal government's power to regulate interstate transportation, even on
state highways, hardly seemed debatable.
Nonetheless, the judge speculated orally about whether Alaska and
Hawaii, being contiguous to no other states, enjoyed a constitutional sta-
tus different from the other forty-eight states. "I ask myself," he told
counsel, "whether trucks and railroad cars that cannot move beyond
Alaska's boundaries are subject to the power vested in Congress by the
commerce clause to regulate commerce among the several states."41
Counsel for the manufacturers quickly thought of a response to this rhe-
torical question: Chief Justice Marshall's statement that "the power of
Congress [to regulate foreign and interstate commerce] may be exercised
within a State."'42
But before counsel could respond, the judge announced that the
"question" was more fundamental, namely, whether the commerce
clause gives Congress any authority to regulate land transportation
except on federal property? "I draw your attention," he said, "to the
sobering comments in Railroad Co. v. Maryland":
The navigable waters of the earth are recognized public highways of
trade and intercourse .... But it is different with transportation by land.
This, when the Constitution was adopted, was entirely performed on
common roads, and in vehicles drawn by animal power. No one at that
day imagined that the roads and bridges of the country (except when the
latter crossed navigable streams) were not entirely subject, both as to
their construction, repair, and management, to State regulation and con-
trol .... [or] supposed that the wagons of the country, or the horses by
which they were drawn, were subject to National regulation.43
40. For an extensive analysis of the supremacy clauses phrase "in pursuance thereof,"
concluding that it means "consistent with," not merely "in consequence of," see R. BERGER,
CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 228-36 (1969).
41. There was no evidence in the record that toxic chemicals were manufactured in Alaska and
then shipped, first by truck or rail and then by water, to other states. Moreover, the manufacturers
did not argue that the federal laws were exercises of Congress' power to regulate commerce with
foreign nations or with Indian tribes, probably because the record did not evidence shipments to
such destinations. Finally, none of the roads subject to the Alaska statute had been constructed with
federal funds.
42. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824).
43. Railroad Co. v. Maryland, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 456, 470 (1874); see also Veazie v. Moor, 55
U.S. (14 How.) 568, 574 (1852) (commerce clause excludes control over turnpikes). This
repudiation of federal authority over land transportation is consistent with a much earlier attitude.
At the nation's inception, there was such widespread agreement that each state had exclusive
authority over the roads within its boundaries that Congress did not venture to build or repair even
postal roads without state consent, despite its explicit constitutional power "To Establish Post Offices
and Post Roads." U.S. CONT. art. I, § 8, cl. 7. When the states attached conditions to their
consents, Congress meekly acceded to these limits. See L. ROGERS, THE POSTAL POWER OF
CONGRESS 61-96 (1916); see also Searight v. Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 151, 151-54 (1845) (describing
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Seeking to discredit the sharp eighteenth century constitutional dis-
tinction between land and water transportation, counsel for the chemical
manufacturers cited a string of twentieth century commerce clause cases
upholding the federal government's right to regulate transportation on
state highways that affects interstate commerce.' To the judge, how-
ever, these cases merely documented the already familiar phenomenon
that the Jurisprudence of Original Intent had fallen into alarming desue-
tude. "The Bicentennial of the Jurisprudence of Original Intent should
be taken as a call for action, not as an exercise in nostalgia," he observed.
The judge acknowledged that technological improvements had con-
verted the primitive roads travelled by the framers45 into today's
admirable network of high-speed highways; but, in his view, these
improvements did not alter the roads' original constitutional status."
"The Constitution absorbs technology but is not changed by it," he
announced. "Just as the federal government's authority over the nation's
navigable waters did not decline when sails gave way to steam,47 so the
state's exclusive jurisdiction over its roads did not diminish when the
roads were improved with planks, crushed stone, or reinforced concrete.
Similarly, when in the fullness of time, technology created railroad trains
and motor vehicles, they acquired at birth the same constitutional status
that, by the framers' intent, was assigned to the ox-drawn wagons of
1787.48 Let us not forget that as recently as 1874-when we already had
a coast-to-coast railroad-the Supreme Court recognized that federal
power to reach into the states to regulate railroads was problematic
because the iron horse was merely a technological improvement on the
ox-cart, which the framers had subjected to the exclusive authority of the
states.49
the legislative history of Cumberland Road); Young, A Political and Constitutional Study of the
Cumberland Road 37-47 (Univ. of Chicago, doctoral dissertation, 1902). But see Story,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 1137-1140 (1833) (contending
that Congress had broader authority than it had so far chosen to exercise).
44. See, eg., Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, 348 U.S. 61 (1954) (invalidating Illinois statute
that prohibited use of state highways by federally licensed interstate motor carriers that had
repeatedly violated state weight and load distribution regulations).
45. For descriptions of the nation's early roads, see G. TAYLOR, 4 THE EcONOMIC HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES 15-17 (The Transportation Revolution, 1815-1860) (1951). For a
description of the framers' difficult travels on these primitive roads, see R. BEROER, FEDERALISM,
supra note 17, at 23-24.
46. See R. BERGER, FEDERALISM, supra note 17, at 124-25 ("Economic expansion cannot
alter the meaning the constitutional terms had for the Founders, particularly when alteration results
in a takeover of internal functions which the States did not dream of surrendering.").
47. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 219-21.
48. Railroad Co., 88 U.S. at 474-75.
49. Railroad Co., 88 U.S. at 474-75. For an exposition of Congress' reliance on its power to
establish military and postal roads as a basis for regulating the railroads (thus sidestepping doubts
about its authority under the commerce clause), see L. HANEY, A CONGRESSIONAL HISTORY OF
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"This conclusion," the judge commented, "must not be disparaged
as the perpetuation of an outdated 18th century distinction."
Federal regulation of land transportation ineluctably intrudes on state
sovereignty far more than federal regulation of the nation's navigable
waters, as was evident to the discerning eyes of the framers. Even if the
degrees of intrusion were similar, the distinction was made by the fram-
ers. If it is to be obliterated, the proper instrument is an amendment to
the Constitution, not a lawsuit before judges sworn to uphold, not alter,
the Constitution.
Responding to the charge that the principles undergirding his ruling
might metastasize from the state's highways to the heavens above and
thus jeopardize control of the air lanes and balkanize the nation's already
dangerous skies, the judge said that this issue was not before him. He
ominously referred, however, to the state's "complete, unqualified, and
exclusive"5 0 police power to protect the health, tranquility, and safety of
its citizenry, from whatever quarter a threat might come. Raising even
more unsettling doubts, the judge suggested that federal regulation of air
transportation might have to be confined to cargo planes because the
framers did not intend Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce
to encompass the movement of persons from state to state.5
Following his decision in the Alaska Toxics Case, a reporter from a
national legal magazine interviewed the judge. Portions of the interview
are reproduced below.
Q. Judge, commentators have described your decision in the
Alaska Toxics Case as the most dramatic application of the Jurisprudence
of Original Intent in twenty years. Before you became a judge, you prac-
ticed almost exclusively in the federal tax area. Wasn't that an unusual
training ground for your Toxics decision?
A. Unusual, perhaps, but not inadequate.
Q. Would you explain?
A. Sure. Tax lawyers routinely invoke "legislative intent,""2
which, as you probably know, is to statutory law what "original intent"
is to constitutional law. You may have heard of the personal injury law-
yer who when asked what he thought of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
replied, "In my law office, we think of little else." The same could be
said of tax lawyers and "legislative intent." In fact, someone once said
that they look at the Internal Revenue Code only if the committee
RAILWAYS IN THE UNrrED STATES, 1850-1887, at 156, 200-13 (Bull. of U. of Wis., Economics and
Political Science Series, Vol. VI, 1910).
50. Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 139 (1837).
51. See R. BERGER, FEDERALISM, supra note 17, at 125 (concern about the free passage of
goods, not of people, prompted the commerce clause).
52. For example, a Lexis search reported that 364 federal tax cases for the period 1981 to 1988
referred to "legislative intent."
1989]
HeinOnline -- 77 Cal. L. Rev. 249 1989
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
reports are ambiguous. 53
Q. Doesn't the search for the legislative intent underlying the
Internal Revenue Code's statutory language make tax lawyers
uncomfortable?
A. Well, some novices can't tolerate ambiguity, but they soon drop
out. Those who remain thrive on uncertainty. In this respect, successful
tax lawyers are like surgeons.
Q. Did your attitude toward using legislative intent to construe the
Internal Revenue Code change when you became a judge?
A. Not in the slightest. Have you ever read the Code, or any other
recent federal statute? If you have, you would realize that construing
specific provisions in light of their legislative intent is a liberating experi-
ence. If I couldn't look behind the letter of the law, I would resign my
judicial commission.
Q. This "liberating experience" that you extol, does it also occur
when you turn to constitutional issues?
A. In spades.
Q. Why do you say that?
A. Simple. In searching for the intent of Congress, tax lawyers
and judges look almost exclusively to one source: the legislative commit-
tee reports. These reports are written by a legislative bureaucracy, tax
committee staffs, who track the statutory language phrase-by-phrase,
responding indirectly to questions raised by the Internal Revenue Service
and practitioners and thereby helping to bridge the gap between the law
on the books and the law in practice. Once in a while, of course, the
Congress' intent is extracted from a floor debate, but that is often just a
staged colloquy in which a committee chairperson responds to a mem-
ber's request for clarification by reading a prepared answer. Occasionally
tax courts even cite unofficial oral or written statements at a committee
hearing. By and large, however, the committee reports are the sole
source of legislative intent, and if they embody only a fictional intent, it is
a fiction that Congress intends the courts to act on.
When you look for the framer's intent, the situation is totally differ-
ent. No single source dominates. Judges must pick their way through
the official records of the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, which con-
tain no verbatim transcript of the debates; the unofficial notes taken by
Madison and others; The Federalist Papers, which have no official sanc-
tion; the meager reports of the thirteen ratifying conventions; and a mis-
cellany of letters, memoirs, pamphlets, early judicial decisions,
Congressional debates, newspaper reports, and the like.54 That's quite a
challenge. If you want to see for yourself how fascinatingly diverse these
sources are, spend an hour or two with the recently published five-
53. The same may be true of judges. See Focht v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 223, 244 (1977)
(Hall, J., dissenting) ("It has been said, with more than a grain of truth, that judges in tax cases these
days tend to consult the statute only when the legislative history is ambiguous.").
54. See infra section III. B.; text accompanying notes 75-123.
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volume work entitled The Founders' Constitution, by Philip B. Kurland
and Ralph Lerner, which promises to be the most durable intellectual
product of the 1987 Bicentennial of the Constitution. 5 Kurland and
Lerner's compilation of the evidence reveals that the founders' intent
does not have the consistency of homogenized milk. 6 It is more like a
well-stocked pantry waiting for the imaginative chef.
Q. What you say, judge, puzzles me. I thought that the Jurispru-
dence of Original Intent was supposed to constrain judges, not to liberate
them.
A. If that is what its exponents want, they would have been more
guarded if they had first talked to some tax lawyers.
Q. Could you expand on that answer?
A. Read your Kurland and Lerner, and you will see what I mean.
C. The Corporate Due Process Case
Shortly after the Alaska Toxics Case restored the legal relationship
between Congress and the states to the arrangement contemplated by the
framers and the Interstate Monopoly Case forced Congress to relinquish
the regulatory authority over interstate private enterprise that the fram-
ers never conferred on it, the Corporate Due Process Case applied the
same potent legal corrective to limit the fifth amendment's guarantee of
due process of law to natural persons, as originally intended by the fram-
ers. The court held that because both the language and history of the
fifth amendment compel the conclusion that corporations are not "per-
sons," they have no constitutional claim to procedural due process-a
determination that obviously applies a fortiori to Johnny-come-lately
substantive due process.
This arresting and unexpected application of the Jurisprudence of
Original Intent was not the fruit of brilliant advocacy in a test case.
Rather, it was the denouement of a run-of-the-mill lawsuit, brought by a
lawyer who made so many errors in presenting his client's case that his
incompetence would have warranted professional censure had it not been
the proximate cause of his client's victory.
The case itself was simple. An inventor brought suit against a busi-
ness corporation for damages for patent infringement. The plaintiff's
lawyer, appearing in court for the first time, was unfamiliar with the
facts, hazy about the law of evidence, inept in rephrasing questions, and
perfunctory when cross-examining the defendant's witnesses. The
55. 1 P. KURLAND & P. LERNER, THE FOUNDERS' CONsTrrUTION at xi (1987) ("[W]e are in
effect seeking to recover an 'original understanding' of those who agitated for, proposed, argued
over, and ultimately voted for or against the Constitution of 1787.").
56. Id. at xii ("We are loath to dangle before the reader yet another promise that the crooked
will be made straight and the rough places plain; we promise, rather, complexity and
complication.").
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defendant's lawyer, a master in making the worse seem the better cause,
exploited his opponent's ineptitude. As the trial progressed, the judge
became increasingly convinced that occasional interventions from the
bench-her usual tactic when unequal advocacy obscured the merits of a
case-were not having their accustomed effect.
The judge then announced to counsel and the jury that "a lawsuit is
not a gladiatorial contest, but a dispassionate search for justice." She
indicated thereafter she would act as "counsel for the truth" to ensure
that "the facts are accurately presented to the jury." When defense
counsel asked what this announcement meant, the judge responded,
"You'll find out soon enough, counselor. Proceed."
From then on, the judge repeatedly intervened. She examined wit-
nesses on both direct and cross, suggested to plaintiff's counsel how his
questions could be rephrased to surmount objections made by the defend-
ant's lawyer, volunteered objections to defense counsel's questions, dis-
paraged the credibility of the defendant's witnesses, and called the jury's
attention to contradictions in the defendant's case. Moreover, immedi-
ately after the defense rested its case, the judge directed defense counsel
to produce several employees for examination in camera. Finding that
the employees knew facts helpful to the plaintiff's case, the judge brought
them into court for questioning to supplement the plaintiff's case in
chief. In charging the jury, the judge described this episode as "my for-
tunate last minute discovery of facts that the defendant tried to keep
from you."
The jury found for the plaintiff, and awarded damages twice that
claimed in the complaint, recommending that the court treble the dam-
ages as punishment for "the defendant's attempt to suppress the facts."
The defendant's counsel moved to set aside the jury's verdict on the
ground that the judge's conduct had violated his client's fifth amendment
rights by denying it due process of law. After the parties briefed this
issue, the judge acknowledged that her interventions during the trial
"hovered on the edge of judicial impropriety." Nevertheless, she ruled
that it was unnecessary to determine whether she had crossed the line
because corporations are not covered by the fifth amendment's guarantee
that "[n]o person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law."57
In so ruling, she made two points:
57. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added by the judge). The judge observed in an aside that
the defendant would have to stand or fall on its fifth amendment claim to due process. She was
tempted, she said, to augment that constitutional guarantee by holding that the federal courts are
required to conduct trials in accordance with "the principles of natural justice," but such an extra-
constitutional obligation would be an unprincipled exertion of raw judicial power in violation of the
Jurisprudence of Original Intent. In support of this conclusion, she adduced the two-centuries-old
observation of Justice Iredell: "The ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard; the
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L The Requirement of Person
The fifth amendment deals with five subjects: (a) indictment "for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime," (b) double jeopardy "of life or
limb," (c) compulsion "in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self," (d) deprivation of "life, liberty, or property without due process of
law," and (e) the taking of private property "without just compensa-
tion." 8 The introductory term "person" indissolubly links the first four
of these guarantees together. In striking contrast, the fifth guarantee, the
only one of the five that can explicitly apply as readily and as fully to
corporations as to natural persons, breaks with the phraseology used for
the first four by stating, in impersonal terms, that "private property
[shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation."' 9
Moreover, she said, the due process clause of the fifth amendment is
the spiritual descendant of Magna Carta, which provided that "no man
shall be disfranchised of any right, but by due process of law, or the judg-
ment of his peers. "I She then noted that a commentator recently out-
lined the import of due process when the Constitution was adopted and
the evidence there compiled does not even hint at the inclusion of corpo-
rations but, to the contrary, suggests that due process can hardly
embrace anything but natural persons.61 Confirming the validity of this
analysis, the leading case that explicitly addressed this issue in the fram-
ers' day distinguished between "the word 'liberties' which peculiarly sig-
nifies those privileges and rights that corporations have by virtue of the
instruments that incorporate them, and is certainly used [in the North
Carolina constitution] in contradistinction to the word 'liberty' which
refers to the personal liberty of the citizen."'62 It is also noteworthy that
the analogous "law of the land" guarantee of the Northwest Ordinance
of 1787 is similarly confined to natural persons: "No man shall be
deprived of his liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or
the law of the land .... 63
In giving scant attention to the constitutional status of corporations,
ablest and the purest men have differed upon the subject ... ." Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386,
399 (1798) (Iredall, J., concurring).
58. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
59. Id.
60. 5 P. KURLAND & R. LERNER, supra note 55, at 313 (quoting Alexander Hamilton,
Remarks on an Act for Regulating Elections, New York Assembly (Feb. 6, 1787) (emphasis added));
see also 4 W. BLcSTONE, COMMENTARIES *416-17.
61. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 17, at 193-200.
62. University of North Carolina v. Foy, 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 57, 62 (1805) (emphasis in original).
63. 1 U.S.C. at XLVI (1982). For the relationship between "due process of law" and "the law
of the land," see generally R BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 17, at 195-200;
Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War (pts. I & 2), 24 HARV. L. REV.
366, 460 (1911); Howe, The Meaning of "Due Process of Law" Prior to the Adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 18 CALIF. L. REV. 581 (1930).
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the framers were, of course, creatures of their own era, as Justice Curtis
noted when he lectured at the Harvard Law School in 1872-1873:
I suppose it may fairly be said, that neither the framers of the Con-
stitution nor the framers of the Judiciary Act [of 1789] had corporations
in view. They were so few at that time, so entirely unimportant, that it is
probable they were passed over without any notice or consideration. I
had the curiosity to-day to look into the first volume of the Special Laws
of Massachusetts, which, at the time of the formation of the Constitution,
was perhaps as wealthy a State, in proportion to its population, and as
likely to have created business corporations, as any other; and I find that
between the time when the Constitution of Massachusetts was formed,
and the time when the Constitution of the United States was adopted and
[the] Judiciary Act passed, the State of Massachusetts created but one
private corporation, and that was the Marine Society of the town of
Salem. There was no bank, no insurance company, of course no railroad
corporation or corporation owning steamers, or any of those things
which at this day are of such magnitudef
4
2. Fourteenth Amendment Concerns
The judge then adverted to decisions holding that corporations are
encompassed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.65
At first blush, she admitted, this principle seems to imply that the due
process clause of the fifth amendment, the constitutional precursor of the
fourteenth amendment's due process clause, also covered corporations,
despite the evidence to the contrary cited above. But she then turned to
Professor Hurst, the premier historian of American law's adjustment to
the business corporation, for an explanation of this initially surprising
discrepancy:
Without violence to language, [the fourteenth amendment's] protection
of "persons" could be extended by fresh lawmaking to cover corpora-
tions, and its protection of "liberty" and "property," to cover the func-
tional integrity of corporate business. An important role of
constitutional standards is to legitimate adapting legal order to social
change. Prevailing opinion accepts such adaptation-particularly at the
hands of the Supreme Court-where constitutional doctrine is shaped in
conformity with facts recognized as relevant to deeply felt values. No
social goal was dearer to the late-nineteenth-century United States than
64. B. CURTIS, JURISDICTION, PRACTICE, AND PECULIAR JURISPRUDENCE OF THE COURTS
OF THE UNITED STATES 128-29 (1880); see also I J. DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY IN
AMERICAN CORPORATIONS 75-107 (1917); 2 id. passim.
65. The case usually cited for this principle is Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R.R.
Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886) (Court announced that it did not want to hear argument on the issue
because all the justices agreed that the fourteenth amendment's due process clause applied to
corporations.). See also Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 718-19 (1879). For an extended review of
this curious episode, see FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
Vol. VII, 724 et. seq.
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increase of economic productivity. By the 1890s the corporation had
emerged as the principal instrument for organizing large business enter-
prise. Extension [by the courts] of the fourteenth amendment's protec-
tion to corporations as "persons" provoked no significant contemporary
controversy.
66
The judge then pointed out that nothing in the case before her
required her to comment on the legitimacy of the "fresh judicial lawmak-
ing" that expanded the meaning of "persons" as used in the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. She noted, however, that two mem-
bers of the Supreme Court had questioned the decisions creating that
expansion.' By contrast, the judge stated that she did have to rule on
the corporate defendant's claim under the fifth amendment. Conse-
quently, she concluded, "If I were to affix my imprimatur on this corpo-
ration's assertion that it is entitled to due process of law under the fifth
amendment, I would do violence to the Jurisprudence of Original Intent
and would deserve to be condemned as a judicial activist."
III
THE MANAGEMENT OF "ORIGINAL INTENT" LITIGATION
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
United States Court of Appeals, Special Panel Rules to Govern
Constitutional Cases Involving the "'Jurisprudence
of Original Intent"
Case Management Order No. 1
Pursuant to the Supreme Court's rulemaking authority, the Court
66. J. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1780-1970, at 68 (1970) (emphasis added); see also id at 69 (rejecting the
"conspiracy theory" of the fourteenth amendment, spawned much later, which asserted that wily
lawyers smuggled corporations into the fourteenth amendment's due process clause as a "capitalist
joker"). For a more extended account of the conspiracy theory, see Graham, The "Conspiracy
Theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 YALE L.J. 371, 374 (1938). Nothing in Graham's
thorough study conflicts with Professor Hurst's conclusion that the courts brought corporations into
the protected class by "fresh lawmaking." See, e.g., id. at 386 n.50 ("[O]ne searches the debates in
Congress and in the ratifying legislatures in vain for any intimation to the effect that the Fourteenth
Amendment afforded prospective relief to corporations."); id at 393 (Sen. Bingham's major speeches
give no indication that he, the "principal alleged conspirator," regarded corporations as "persons"
for due process purposes.); id. at 391, 396 (Only objects of Sen. Bingham's solicitude were natural
persons.).
Although Berger's extensive analysis of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause does
not explicitly discuss whether the term "persons" was intended at the outset to include corporations,
R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 17, at 201-20, Berger implicitly supports
Hurst's view that judicial lawmaking expanded "persons" to include corporations by emphasizing
the framers' intent to "constitutionalize the Civil Rights Bill," a bill concerned with the rights of
natural persons. See id at 218-19.
67. Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 576-77 (1949) (Douglas, J., joined by
Black, J., dissenting); Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 87 (1938) (Black,
J., dissenting).
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created this Special Panel in 1998. We serve as administrative supervisor
of the federal court system, to facilitate the disposition at the trial and
appellate levels of constitutional cases involving the Jurisprudence of
Original Intent. We intend to discharge our delegated responsibility by
issuing a series of Case Management Orders, as explained below, of
which this is No. 1.
A. Recent Developments in the Field of Original Intent
Three of the earliest and best known Jurisprudence of Original
Intent cases are the Interstate Monopoly Case, the Alaska Toxics Case,
and the Corporate Due Process Case. These three seminal cases have
inspired, by recent count, almost 2,500 federal district court suits seeking
to apply the original intent principles to a wide variety of assertedly
analogous situations. Moreover, parties in hundreds of other cases have
asked the federal district courts to reverse landmark decisions in a diver-
sity of areas, on the ground that these historic rulings cannot be recon-
ciled with the framers' original intent. Although most of these cases are
awaiting decision, they have attracted so much publicity that almost
every one of them has elicited its own family of imitators.
This flood of original intent litigation has not confined itself to the
Constitution and Bill of Rights. A rapidly growing wing of the Jurispru-
dence of Original Intent school of thought has looked to the Declaration
of Independence as well. This group asserts that the Declaration of Inde-
pendence is "an organic law," that is, "an organizing or constituting
law," of the United States.68 As such, the Declaration, it is argued, has
substantive constitutional consequences-emanations from a penumbra,
if one wants a metaphor.69 For example, some states have recently
68. See, eg., W. BERNS, TAKING THE CONsTITtmON SERIoUsLY 23 (1987):
In the various official compilations of American laws . . . the Declaration of
Independence enjoys what might be seen as pride of place, ahead of the Articles of
Confederation, the Northwest Ordinance, and the Constitution and its amendments....
Indeed, in more than one of these compilations-for example, in the 1970 edition of the
United States Code-it is classified as one of the "Organic Laws of the United States."
An organic law is an organizing or constituting law, and the Declaration is the first
such American law because, according to the political theory informing it, before there can
be legitimate government, there must be a people, a people to institute it, and before there
can be a people there must be a compact among persons who, by nature, are free and
independent-which is to say, independent of each other.
See also Jaffa, Letter to the Editor, COMMENTARY, May 1988, at 6 (criticizing Judge Bork for
failing to "display the slightest awareness that the principles of the Constitution are to be found in
the Declaration of Independence" and emphasizing that natural rights and natural law "were the
historic foundation of the historic Constitution"); Jaffa, What Were the "Original Intentions" of the
Framers of the Constitution of the United States, 10 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 351, 363-64 (1987)
("mhe Declaration remains the most fundamental dimension of the law of the Constitution.").
69. See Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) ([The early privacy cases suggest "that
specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those
guarantees that help give them life and substance.").
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required their school systems to instruct all pupils in "the Laws of
Nature and of Nature's God,"70 despite objections based on the first
amendment (as applied to states by the incorporation doctrine-itself
a subject of attack). The defenders of the legislation argue that the
first amendment is subordinate to the paramount instrument of our
nationhood, the Declaration of Independence. In the same vein, a few
school systems have amended the Pledge of Allegiance, over the objec-
tion of various religious groups, to describe our country as "one nation,
under Nature's God."
Exponents of the organic or constitutional status of the Declaration
of Independence have also seized on its statement that "all men are cre-
ated equal,"71 asserting that this "truth" should be inculcated by an offi-
cial national catechism, to be recited ceremoniously at suitable intervals
by the citizenry. Legislation to this end has generated more than a score
of lawsuits; even so, we may be looking only at the tip of the iceberg.
Legislators in many states have been persuaded that the framers origi-
nally intended this "truth" to be more spacious than its naked language,
and that its true meaning is "all men [women, and children] are created
[and were intended by their Creator to remain] equal [from the cradle to
the grave]."
With this exegesis, the revealed intent of "Nature's God" inspired
several state legislatures to enact an array of uncompromisingly egalita-
rian laws, including equal pay for all employees and the abolition of
inheritance.72 When these emanations from the language of the Declara-
tion of Independence were unveiled, some members of the critical legal
studies movement,73 announced that "socialism is twentieth century
Americanism" and, sub nom. The Tom Paine Brigade, joined the Juris-
prudence of Original Intent movement. When these CLS shock troops
entered by the front gate, a dozen self-styled "Original Original Inten-
tionists" left by the rear, asking plaintively "What hath Nature's God
wrought?"
The Declaration of Independence is also the foundation for several
state court reinterpretations of the fifth amendment's "just compensa-
70. For a colonial precursor of this invocation of a higher law, see John Adam's reference to
"rights antecedent to all earthly government... Rights, derived from the great Legislator of the
Universe." C. HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS 54 n.1 (1930) (quoting John
Adams).
71. The Declaration of Independence para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
72. For a prescient recognition of the Declaration's egalitarian heart, see Ledewitz, Judicial
Conscience and Natural Rights" A Reply to Professor Jaffa, 10 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 449, 470
(1987) ("Once we take the rights of persons seriously and the strengthening of free government as
law's obligation, we cannot avoid asking about the rest of the rights of man: about economic rights--
to shelter, food, clothing, and education ....").
73. Who were already demoralized by their inability to read Professor Unger's books as fast as
he was able to write them.
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tion" clause. These courts ruled that the framers intended "just compen-
sation" for private property taken for public use to be computed not by
reference to the trumped-up prices of a mercantile bazaar, but instead
pursuant to "the laws of Nature and of Nature's God," which embody a
"just price" concept suitable to a society aspiring to be a world class City
on a Hill. 4
On reviewing the major features of this unprecedented flood of liti-
gation, we have concluded that our mission can be discharged most expe-
ditiously by commissioning an orderly analysis of certain threshold issues
common to all of the cases within our jurisdiction. Accordingly, we have
identified two threshold issues that are inherent in virtually all of them:
(1) what types of evidence can properly support judicial conclusions
about the original intent of the framers;75 and (2) what principles should
determine whether earlier decisions, if now found inconsistent with the
intent of the framers, should be reversed, qualified, or preserved. Case
Management Order Number One will address these preliminary issues.
To ensure that these issues are fully briefed and presented without intol-
erable repetition, we will shortly appoint a Special Master, with power to
allocate responsibility for briefing and arguing the threshold issues
among counsel in all of the cases on our calendar.
We turn now to the issues to be addressed at this preliminary stage
of our proceedings.
B. Evidence Establishing Original Intent
In a preliminary perusal of the briefs and opinions in the cases sub-
ject to this Case Management Order, we have encountered quotations
from a variety of letters, speeches, newspaper accounts, pamphlets, and
other materials, which are offered as evidence of the framers' original
intent. A few of these documents explicitly report or refer to debates at
deliberative assemblies discharging official responsibilities. These docu-
ments are sometimes in the form of the author's recollection of the event
itself, but more often they set out the author's own views, supported pri-
marily or solely by his eminence or argumentative skill. Even when
statements by individual members of a deliberative assembly are quoted
or summarized, the documents almost never establish whether the
speaker's views were accepted or endorsed by his colleagues or whether
persons voting with him had their own independent (and possibly incon-
sistent) reasons for reaching the same result. Finally, the documents do
74. See V. DEMANT, THE JusT PRICE 29-30 (1930) (A producer "should receive what would
fairly recompense him for his labour; not what would enable him to make gain, but what would
permit him to live a decent life... appropriate to his class.").
75. This issue necessarily requires an analysis of the basic hermeneutic principles implicit in
the Jurisprudence of Original Intent. See infra notes 99-104.
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not substantiate if the intent manifested by the members of a particular
deliberative assembly (for example, the Philadelphia Convention or an
early state ratification convention) was shared by delegates to other later
assemblies.
Therefore, we instruct the Special Master to arrange for a consoli-
dated discussion by counsel of the criteria, principles, and presumptions
that should govern the courts in determining whether specific statements
commanded enough support from the speaker's colleagues to be charac-
terized as a consensus. How, in short, are we to distinguish between the
intent of a framer, and the intent of the framers?
We turn now to the special problems raised by references in the
briefs and opinions to particular sources of information about the intent
of the framers.
L The Philadelphia Convention's Official Records
As every schoolchild knows, the Philadelphia Convention of 1787
conducted its proceedings under a secrecy rule, which provided:
That no copy be taken of any entry on the journal during the sitting
of the House without the leave of the House.
That members only be permitted to inspect the journal.
That nothing spoken in the House be printed, or otherwise pub-
lished, or communicated without leave.7 6
Even before this secrecy rule was adopted, a proposal to permit
members to call for a vote and have the votes recorded was rejected
unanimously." According to Madison's notes, a member objected to
this proposal because "as the acts of the Convention were not to bind the
Constituents it was unnecessary to exhibit this evidence of the votes.""8
Another representative felt that a record of the members' opinions
"would be an obstacle to a change of them on conviction," and that if the
records were later released, the voting recorded could "furnish handles to
the adversaries of the Result of the Meeting." 9
76. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 15 (M. Farrand ed. 1911)
(footnote omitted) [hereinafter RECORDS]. For complaints about the Philadelphia Convention's
secrecy rule, see Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Aug. 30, 1787), reprinted in 3 id. at
76 (Jefferson regretted that the Philadelphia Convention "began their deliberations by so abominable
a precedent as that of tying up the tongues of their members."); 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES ON THE
FEDERAL CONSTITTION 170 (2d ed. 1881) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES] (Patrick Henry
addressing the Virginia Convention) ("[lit would have given more general satisfaction, if the
proceedings of [the Philadelphia] Convention had not been concealed from the public eye."). Cf.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3 (Each House of Congress may withhold from publication such parts of
its journal "as may in their Judgment require Secrecy.").
77. 1 RECORDS, supra note 76, at 10.
78. Id.
79. Id. The Convention's Journal records votes by states, not delegate-by-delegate. Eg., id at
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The Convention might have allowed this gag rule to expire when it
adjourned, but instead it renewed the rule after these comments:
Mr. King suggested that the Journals of the Convention should be
either destroyed, or deposited in the custody of the President. He
thought if suffered to be made public, a bad use would be made of them by
those who would wish to prevent the adoption of the Constitution-
Mr. Wilson preferred the second expedient. [Hue had at one time
liked the first best; but as false suggestions may be propagated it should
not be made impossible to contradict them- 80
With only one dissent, the delegates then adopted a motion to
deposit the journals and other papers of the Convention with its presi-
dent, George Washington, "subject to the order of Congress, if ever
formed under the Constitution."'" In compliance with this motion, the
secretary of the Convention, "after burning all the loose scraps" 82 (in
what may have been the first paper-shredding episode in our nation's
history), delivered "the Journal and other papers" 83 to George Washing-
ton. He in turn deposited them with the State Department. The docu-
ments remained there until 1818, when, pursuant to a joint resolution of
Congress, they were collated by John Quincy Adams and published the
following year.84
In 1824, just five years later, counsel arguing Gibbons v. Ogden
before the Supreme Court cited the journal.8 5 Of course, both counsel
and the courts in later years have relied regularly on the journal for
authority.86 Even so, we doubt the propriety of judicial reliance on these
Convention documents in interpreting the Constitution. We therefore
request counsel to address the issues set out below.
First, does the fact that two delegates to the Convention (and per-
haps their colleagues) contemplated destruction of the Convention's offi-
cial records conflict with the courts' use of these records as evidence of
meaning of the Constitution?
80. 2 id, at 648 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
81. Id Rossiter concluded that the "veil of secrecy never did get lifted more than an inch or
two during the struggle for ratification." C. RossrTER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 283 n.*
(1966). If this is correct, this may have been the first and last time in American history when the
deliberations of a large governmental assembly were not leaked promptly to the press.
82. Letter from William Jackson to George Washington (Sept. 17, 1787), reprinted in 3
RECORDS (rev'd ed. 1966), supra note 76, at 82.
83. Id.
84. 1 id at xi-xii; see also Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the
Documentary Record, 65 TEx. L. REV. 1, 6-9 (1986) ("[Ihe journal, as published by John Quincy
Adams .. ., [is] a reliable text.").
85. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 86 (1824) (Mr. Emmett, for the respondent).
86. See generally tenBroek, Use By the United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids in
Constitutional Construction, 26 CALIF. L. REV. 437 (1938) (overview of cases in which the Supreme
Court relied upon the debates and proceedings of the constitutional and ratifying conventions in
formulating opinions).
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Second, if the framers' original intent was to sanction use of the
documents as evidence of the meaning of the Constitution, would they
have vested Congress with discretion to unveil the documents or preserve
their secrecy according to the wishes of a transitory legislative majority?
Counsel are requested to consider whether judicial reliance on docu-
ments that could be suppressed or released at the discretion of Congress
would constitute a de facto method of amending the Constitution with-
out complying with the formal amendment procedure prescribed by arti-
cle V.
Third, counsel should consider a commentator's recent statement:
"As has often been noted, if [the record of the Convention] had come to
light at the time of the ratification debates, the Constitution would never
have passed.""7 In conjunction with that observation and assuming
arguendo that the documents would otherwise be admissible, can courts
properly rely on documents that were deliberately withheld from the
ratifiers lest "a bad use would be made of them by those who would wish
to prevent the adoption of the Constitution."8 " Counsel should remem-
ber that the suppression of the Convention's documents after its adjourn-
ment entailed a quadruple concealment: (1) from the states, which had
chosen the delegates to the Philadelphia Convention; (2) from Congress,
to which the draft Constitution was submitted and which had sole
responsibility for forwarding it to the state ratifying conventions; (3)
from "We the People," who were to choose the delegates to the ratifying
conventions; 9 and (4) from the ratifiers. Can we presume that the fram-
ers dishonorably intended to sanction use of the suppressed documents
once the perceived threat to ratification was foiled? Should we instead
resolve this issue in their favor by assuming that they would have repudi-
ated such a tactic?
In responding to these questions, counsel would do well to take
account of Justice Black's objection to the use of a congressional commit-
tee's secret journal, which was belatedly proffered to establish the com-
mittee's intent in drafting the fourteenth amendment.90 Needless to say,
the issue is not whether Justice Black properly branded that particular
instance as a breach of faith. Rather, the issue is how the courts should
respond if a suppressed document is unveiled after the concealment has
87. G. WILLS, CINCINNATUS: GEORGE WASHINGTON AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT 157
(1984); cf R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 117 (1973) ("ratification
was touch and go"); C. ROSSITER, supra note 81, at 276 (ratification "might have gone either way").
88. 2 RECORDS, supra note 76, at 648.
89. See Amar, Our Forgotten Constitution: A Bicentennial Comment, 97 YALE L.J. 281, 288
(1987) (discussing the People's lack of access to Philadelphia Convention's records).
90. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 86-87 (1938) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
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served its intended function of disarming the opposition.91
Long before Justice Black raised this issue, Justice Story had asked:
"If the Constitution was ratified under the belief, sedulously propagated
on all sides, that such protection [against foreign competition] was
afforded [by the commerce clause], would it not now be a fraud upon the
whole people to give a different construction to its powers?" 92 True,
Story was concerned with an affirmative representation made to the
ratifiers, but is fraud not fraud, whether accomplished by an affirmative
representation or by a deliberate nondisclosure? 93
2. Madison's Notes
James Madison's notes of the Philadelphia Convention's debates,
published in 1840 and cited a few years later by the Supreme Court,94
have been "from the day of their publication until the present ... the
standard authority for the proceedings of the Convention." 95 It may,
therefore, seem quixotic to question the propriety of using these notes as
evidence of the framers' original intent. We would not be faithful to our
oaths of office, however, if we did not request counsel to address the
sources of our doubts, as summarized below.
91. We also invite counsel's attention to the authoritative documentary history, whose editor
states that James Wilson's widely circulated defense of the Constitution "became, in effect, the
'official' Federalist interpretation of the Constitution, although that interpretation was at
considerable variance with what Wilson and others had declared to be the purpose of the
Constitution during the debates in the Convention." 1 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 26 (M. Jensen ed. 1976) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY]. Berger noted that several proposals to forbid federal interference with internal matters
affecting only the states were voted down at Philadelphia. However, he observed that "when the
Framers emerged from the secrecy of the Convention and were exposed to the sharp winds of
public opinion, they reversed course"-meaning, evidently, that their post-convention assertions, on
which the public relied in ratifying the Constitution, were inconsistent with their actions in
Philadelphia. R. BERGER, FEDERALISM, supra note 17, at 68; see also id. at 70 n.1l0 (describing
Madison's change in tone from his Convention position to his ratification position).
92. 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1084, at
29 (4th ed. 1873) (quoted with approval by R. BERGER, FEDERALISM, supra note 17, at 102).
93. As Raoul Berger has commented in an identical context (the failure to disclose a
Convention decision to the people), "there can be no ratification without disclosure." Berger,
"Original Intention" in Historical Perspective, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 296, 334 (1986).
Commenting on Bickel's suggestion that the framers of the fourteenth amendment concealed
the objective of eliminating segregation because they feared that such an objective would endanger
the amendment's ratification, Berger said, "There is not a shred of evidence that the framers
employed double-talk to hoodwink the ratifiers. If they did, there was no ratification, because '[i]f
the material facts be either suppressed or unknown, the ratification is treated as invalid.'" Berger,
The Activist Legacy of the New Deal Court, 59 WASH. L. REv. 751, 782 (1984) (quoting Owings v.
Hull, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 607, 629 (1835)).
94. Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 396 (1849); see also id. at 474 (Taney, C.J.,
dissenting).
95. 1 RECORDS, supra note 76, at xvi. For the history of Madison's Notes, see 1 THE PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON at xv-xxvii (W. Hutchinson & W. Rachal eds. 1962) [hereinafter MADISON
PAPERS].
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First, Madison's notes are not a verbatim record of the debates. A
recent painstaking quantitative assessment of this distressing deficiency
suggests that Madison reported no more than ten percent of an average
hour's proceedings.96 Furthermore, since Madison's original notes have
not survived, it is impossible to determine "if [Madison] recorded all or
nearly all of each session and then severely compressed the results or if
he followed [the Virginia Convention stenographer's practice] of ignoring
everything that seemed 'desultory' or 'irregular.' "97
In 1996, inspired by this study of Madison's notes, this court com-
missioned the Institute of Forensic Communications of the University of
Bologna to assess the ability of skilled reporters to condense the proceed-
ings of deliberative assemblies without distorting the speakers' intended
messages. The Institute selected for this investigation three meetings: a
law school faculty meeting, an executive session of a legislative body, and
a postargument conference of a fifteen-member appellate court. To com-
pare the results of the alternative methods that Madison might have
used, two reports were prepared for each organization: one condensed
from a verbatim transcript, the other based on notes taken by a partici-
pant-observer, who was instructed to concentrate on important matters
and to ignore whatever was "desultory" or "irregular." Like Madison's
notes, the resulting summaries reflected about ten percent of the original
verbiage.
These summaries were then sent to the speakers, who were asked
whether they accurately conveyed "your original intent as expressed in
your speeches." Most of the replies from law professors and judges used
terms like "butchered", "sabotaged", "unrecognizable", and "quasi-
criminal mischief", but a few stated that the results were "marginally
acceptable." One or two said that their remarks as condensed were
"more forceful," though "less nuanced" than the originals. The legisla-
tors were markedly more tolerant, but this was because, as one respon-
dent put it, "the summaries are at least better than the journalistic
distortions we are accustomed to."9 8 All members of the three groups,
however, asserted that the reports of their colleagues' speeches were
more faithful to the originals than were the reports of their own remarks;
and more than half said that their colleagues' speeches were greatly
improved by the mandatory pruning.
96. Hutson, supra note 84, at 34 (conceding that the estimate may be "impressionistic,
unscientific, and flawed... [yet it] demonstrates that there is a significant quantitative difference
between what Madison recorded and what was said at the Convention").
97. Id at 34-35.
98. INSTITUTE ON FORENSIC COMMUNICATIONS, REPORT ON ABILITY OF SKILLED
REPORTERS TO CONDENSE PROCEEDINGS OF DELIBERATIVE ASSEMBLIES ACCURATELY
(forthcoming) (upon completion, the report will be available for inspection at the offices of the
California Law Review, during business hours).
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We invite counsel to comment on whether these results shed light on
the fidelity of Madison's notes, and to commission additional empirical
studies should they so desire.
Second, despite the significance of this concern, we are even more
troubled by the fundamental issue of whether the framers intended their
debates to be used in interpreting the Constitution. We wish to ensure
that the Jurisprudence of Original Intent is not undermined by rushing
too quickly from hermeneutics to exegesis. Accordingly, we direct coun-
sel's attention to Madison's proclaimed reason for refusing to publish his
notes during his lifetime, as he was often importuned to do. Madison
stated, "As a guide in expounding and applying the provisions of the
Constitution, the debates and incidental decisions of the [Philadelphia]
Convention can have no authoritative character."99 Madison expressed
himself similarly in Congress:
[W]hatever veneration might be entertained for the body of men who
formed our Constitution, the sense of that body [the Philadelphia Con-
vention] could never be regarded as the oracular guide in expounding the
Constitution. As the instrument came from them it was nothing more
than the draft of a plan, nothing but a dead letter, until life and validity
were breathed into it by the voice of the people, speaking through the
several State Conventions.X°°
We request counsel to discuss whether these statements (and others
by Madison)101 accurately reflect a consensus prevailing in the framers'
day that statements made during the Philadelphia Convention should not
determine the meaning of the Constitution."0 2 In this connection, we call
counsel's attention to Professor Powell's recent analysis of the interpreta-
tive principles accepted by the framers at the time of the Philadelphia
Convention.10 3 Moreover, if Madison had thought that his notes could
99. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Ritchie (Sept. 15, 1821), reprinted in 3 LETTERS
AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 228 (Philadelphia 1865).
100. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 776 (1796). Madison also wrote,
Another error has been in ascribing to the intention of the Convention which formed
the Constitution, an undue ascendancy in expounding it. Apart from the difficulty of
verifying that intention it is clear, that if the meaning of the Constitution is to be sought
out of itself, it is not in the proceedings of the Body that proposed it, but in those of the
State Conventions which gave it all the validity & authority it possesses.
Letter of James Madison to N.P. Trist (Dec. 1831), reprinted in 3 RECORDS (rev'd ed. 1966), supra
note 76, at 518 (emphasis in original).
101. See generally Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV.
885, 935-941 (1985) (examples of Madison's expressed misgivings about using the framers' views to
interpret the Constitution).
102. See generally Rotunda, Original Intent, the View of the Framers, and the Role of the
Ratifiers, 41 VAND. L. REV. 507 (1988) (discussing the role of "private" and "public" intent in
interpreting the Constitution).
103. Powell, surpa note 101, at 902-13. For a summary of Powell's views, see Powell, The
Modern Misunderstanding of Original Intent, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1513, 1534 (1987) (reviewing R.
BERGER, FEDERALISM, supra note 17):
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unlock any of the Constitution's interpretative riddles, would he have
treated them as his private property, secreting them for his lifetime, and
thus enabling his widow to release them for this compelling public pur-
pose only when and if Congress was prepared to pay the price?"~
Third, if we conclude that the official journal of the Philadelphia
Convention cannot be used as an interpretative tool because it was delib-
erately withheld from the ratifiers,10 5 how could we countenance use of
Madison's notes to circumvent that constraint? Madison's notes and the
Convention's official records were intertwined. Not only did other dele-
gates regard him "as a semi-official reporter of their proceedings,"' 10 6 to
whom some of them supplied copies of their speeches and motions, but
Madison himself corrected his notes after comparing them with the jour-
nal. Moreover, he sometimes copied journal reports of proceedings of
which he had no personal record. 107
We are aware of numerous judicial references to Madison's notes,
but none addresses the issue of propriety that, as adumbrated above,
troubles us. In expressing our misgivings, we are concerned not with the
use of the notes to embellish a decision reached on other grounds, but
with their use in applying the Jurisprudence of Original Intent when they
would make a difference in reaching a decision. As presently advised,
therefore, we are disposed to exclude Madison's notes if the Philadelphia
Convention's official papers are excluded. 08 It may, however, be feasible
to expunge from Madison's notes all disclosures of material contained in
In my [Harvard Law Review] study, I concluded that regardless of whether the word
[intention] was modified by "of the framers," or "of the states," or "of the Constitution,"
or was used absolutely, "intention" was an attribute or concept attached primarily to the
document itself, and not elsewhere. The debates of framers and ratifiers, the attributed
preferences of states or people, all of these were at most evidence of the Constitution's own
intention. They were persuasive (or not), but-as in the common law tradition-not
directly authoritative.
The "intent[ion]" of a document, I went on to argue, referred to the meaning an
interpreter was entitled to derive from the document using the common law's techniques of
construction. This meaning might or might not be the meaning consciously intended by
the document's makers.
For Berger's criticism of Powell's hermeneutic principles, see Berger, "Original Intention" in Histori-
cal Perspective, supra note 93, at 334.
104. See 1 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 95, at xvii (Mrs. Madison decided to accept $30,000
from Congress for her husband's papers, including the notes, although she originally wanted
$100,000.).
105. See supra text accompanying notes 103-108.
106. 1 RECORDS, supra note 76, at xvi.
107. !L
108. We are, of course, aware that our doubts about the official Journal, see Mr. King's
statement supra note 80, were created by Madison's notes; and at first blush it may seem inconsistent
to use the Notes for this purpose, and then to suggest that both the official Journal and Madison's
unofficial Notes should be excluded. In any event, if counsel thinks we are caught in a vicious circle,
like the paradox of the Cretan who allegedly asserted that Cretans never tell the truth, we are willing
to hear arguments on the point. If counsel undertakes this task, perhaps we can be guided through
the complex network of THE PARADOX OF THE LIAR (R. Martin ed. 1970).
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the Convention's official records. If counsel proffers such a redacted ver-
sion of the notes, we direct the Special Master to determine whether the
fruit of the poisonous tree has been scrupulously eliminated.
3. The Ratifying Conventions
It is easy to blur or even obliterate Madison's distinction between
the limited role of the Philadelphia framers and the plenipotentiary
authority of the state ratifiers (or, in the case of ratifiers bound by
instructions, their constituents)."0 9 Both groups are often treated as
"framers" and "founders" whose interpretative remarks are equally
authoritative. Indeed, if a quantitative measurement of influence were
feasible, it might demonstrate that the Philadelphia debates have influ-
enced commentators and judges more than the obscure voices of the Peo-
ple, speaking through the ratifiers. 110 In applying the Jurisprudence of
Original Intent, however, we accept as fundamental Madison's emphasis
on the paramount role of the ratifiers. But this is only the beginning of
our interpretative journey into the past.
On September 28, 1787, Congress adopted a resclution which trans-
mitted the Constitution, as drafted by the Philadelphia Convention, "to
the several [state] legislatures in Order to be submitted to a convention of
Delegates chosen in each state by the people thereof."11' Pursuant to
this resolution, the ratifiers met in thirteen separate state ratifying con-
ventions. When counsel invokes the remarks of these delegates to estab-
lish the framers' original intent, how should we distinguish between
corporate interpretations of the Constitution, which commanded the
assent of a significant or controlling fraction of the delegates, and per-
sonal opinions, which were regarded by the rest of the delegates as idio-
syncratic utterances? Can we pick and choose in accordance with our
sense of what fits, like a historian who scans all possible evidence and
then stakes his professional reputation on his reconstruction of an earlier
109. See supra text at note 115.
110. To be sure, the 1648 delegates to the state conventions, see 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
(1976), supra note 91, at 25, included some of the 55 Philadelphia framers, 3 RECORDS (rev. ed.
1966), supra note 76, at 557-59, and their influence may well have been proportionately greater than
their number. Even so, when commentators and judges defer to these framer-ratifiers, it is almost
always because they participated in preparing "the draft of a plan" at Philadelphia, not because they
helped to give it "life and validity" by their votes at the state conventions. 5 ANNALS OF CONO.,
supra note 100, at 776 (statements of James Madison).
111. DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN
STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 398, 69th Cong., Ist Sess. 1007 (1927) [hereinafter DOCUMENTS]. Article
VII of the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he Ratification of the Conventions of nine
States, shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying
the Same." U.S. CONST. art. VII. The Constitution does not specify how delegates to the
conventions should be chosen. Congress, however, adopted the Philadelphia Convention's
recommendation of September 17, 1787, that they should be "chosen in each State by the People
thereof, under the Recommendation of its Legislature." See DOCUMENTS, supra, at 1005.
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era? Or must we instead take all opinions supporting the ratification as
equally competent evidence of the intent of the ratifiers, even though
experience teaches that members of a deliberative assembly often vote in
favor of measures even if they do not share, or even reject, the reasons
stated by their more vocal colleagues?' 12
The Supreme Court, in interpreting an act of Congress, dealt with
this very issue of individual opinions as early as 1845:
In expounding this law, the judgment of the court cannot, in any
degree, be influenced by the construction placed upon it by individual
members of Congress in the debate which took place on its passage, nor
by the motives or reasons assigned by them for supporting or opposing
amendments that were offered. The law as it passed is the will of the
majority of both houses, and the only mode in which that will is spoken
is in the act itself, and we must gather their intention from the language
there used, comparing it, when any ambiguity exists, with the laws upon
the same subject, and looking, if necessary, to the public history of the
times in which it was passed. 113
If we eschew these austere interpretative principles, despite their
proximity to the framers' era, and substitute today's more latitudinarian
standards, we may be able to extract an intent of the ratifiers from their
debates at each state convention.' 14 That, however, would take us from
the frying pan into the fire. There were thirteen conventions, which rati-
fied the Constitution in installments between December of 1787 and May
of 1790. Ah, there's the rub. We must distill from these separate con-
claves a homogeneous intent. When Chief Justice Marshall said that "it
is a constitution we are expounding,""' 5 his message surely encompassed
the proposition that the Court was expounding a single Constitution, not
a series of legal arrangements, each reflecting the original intent of a dif-
ferent state's delegates.
We therefore request counsel to consider the implications of this
112. See R. BERGER, FEDERALISM, supra note 17, at 68 n.100 (Madison observed that "[n]o
one acquainted with the proceedings of deliberative bodies can have failed to notice the uncertainty
of inferences drawn from a record of naked votes.") (quoting 3 REcoRDs (Rev. ed. 1966), supra note
76, at 520). Kurland and Lerner similarly noted the difficulty of reconstructing
the intentions of a widely scattered and long-since-dead generation of political actors....
[We are almost utterly in the dark about the manner in which arguments were made or
received: the wink, the look of disgust, the detection of sophisms, are rarely matters of
record and most often are matters of fanciful speculation by the reader.
1 P. KuRLAND & R. LERNER, supra note 55, at xi.
113. Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 9, 24 (1845).
114. But see Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REv. 863, 870 (1930) ("[Ihe
intention of the legislature is undiscoverable in any real sense... ."); Radin, Book Review, 48 YALE
L.J. 1115, 1117 (1939) (determining will of legislature "not an exercise in logic or law but in creative
imagination").
115. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (emphasis in original).
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multiplicity of conventions for the Jurisprudence of Original Intent, and
to address specifically the following issues:
1. Article VII of the United States Constitution provides that rati-
fication of the Constitution by nine state conventions "shall be sufficient
for the Establishment of this Constitution between the [ratifying states]."
Does it follow that June 21, 1788, the date when New Hampshire, the
ninth state to act, ratified the Constitution,116 is the closing date for
determining the founders' original intent? In responding to this question,
we invite counsel to consider Chief Justice Taney's oft-quoted statement
that
as long as [the Constitution] continues to exist in its present form, it
speaks not only in the same words, but with the same meaning and intent
with which it spoke when it came from the hands of its framers, and was
voted on and adopted by the people of the United States. 117
Should we not treat the proceedings of the four laggard states, which
ratified after June 21, 1788, as either cumulative (and hence superfluous)
or irrelevant (because these states were presented with what was, so far
as the framers' intent was concerned, a fait accompli, which they could
accept or reject, but not vary)?1 ' To be sure, the United States as we
now know it would have been unthinkable without New York and
Virginia, the two principal laggards, but is it not equally unthinkable that
any "intent" voiced at their conventions could alter the "intent" mani-
fested at the conventions of the first nine states to act?
2. Similarly, we ask counsel to note that Delaware was the first
state to ratify the Constitution.1 9 Can we accept, as evidence of the
ratifiers' original intent, any views expressed at conventions that met sub-
sequent to Delaware's ratification unless the proffered evidence is consis-
tent with the understanding of the Delaware ratifiers? On this issue, we
direct counsel's attention to the absence of any surviving records of the
Delaware convention's proceedings.' 20 Is the intent of the Delaware
ratifiers less sacrosanct for being either temporarily or permanently lost?
Should we adopt an irrebuttable presumption that Delaware's ratifiers
implicitly agreed to accept as their own, retroactively, whatever intent
116. See DOCUMENTS, supra note 111, at 1024.
117. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 426 (1857) (emphasis added).
118. Rhode Island, for example, did not ratify until May 29, 1790. See DOCUMENTS, supra note
111, at 1056. This was almost two years after Congress announced that the Constitution "has been
ratified in the manner therein declared to be sufficient for the establishment of the same." Id. at
1062. If the intent of late ratifiers matters, how should we weigh the intent of Connecticut, Georgia,
and Massachusetts, which did not ratify the first ten amendments until 1939?
119. See DOCUMENTS, supra note 111, at 1009.
120. See 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1978), supra note 91, at 44, 105. But see 1-3 DELAWARE
CASES 1792-1830 (D. Boorstin ed. 1943) (compilation of early Delaware cases not previously
published; perhaps the records of the Delaware convention, which are cited in many of these early
Delaware cases, may also come to light at some future date).
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might be manifested at conventions meeting after the Delaware conven-
tion disbanded? If so, must we apply this pig-in-a-poke principle to all
post-Delaware conventions, so that the intent of the last ratifiers to act
always trumps the intent of those who acted earlier?
4. The Election of the Ratifiers
At this point, we turn from the original intent of the ratifiers to the
original intent of the People who elected the ratifiers. We have already
quoted Chief Justice Taney's assertion that the meaning of the Constitu-
tion was fixed "when it came from the hands of its framers, and was voted
on and adopted by the people of the United States."121 In some cases, the
local delegates procured their election by pledging to vote for or against
ratification. Accordingly, such delegates were morally and politically
obligated to discharge their commitments at the convention. Indeed,
some were formally instructed by their constituents. 122 Their ears were
in effect closed to argument during the ensuing ratification debate. 2 3 In
these cases, the elections were pro tanto local ratification conventions,
and the elected delegates, no matter how eloquent their remarks at the
later state convention, were merely agents for the voters who chose them.
These considerations raise a question that protagonists of the Juris-
prudence of Original Intent have not explicitly examined. Should the
intent manifested by the voters in these state electoral contests be consid-
ered in ascertaining the original intent of the makers of the Constitution?
At the North Carolina Convention, for example, a delegate said, "[The
Constitution] is no more than a blank till [sic] it be adopted by the peo-
ple. When that is done here, is it not the people of the state of North
Carolina that do it, joined with the people of the other states who have
adopted it?"' 24
If the Jurisprudence of Original Intent requires that courts ascertain
the intent of the voters who selected the delegates to the state ratifying
conventions, counsel could assist us by explaining how we should dis-
charge this responsibility. The raw material before us includes some of
the pamphlets, newspaper reports, speeches, and letters that bombarded
the voters, 125 but we do not know what they judged to be wheat and what
121. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 426 (emphasis added).
122. For a description of instructions to some Connecticut delegates, see 3 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY (1978), supra note 91, at 405, 410-411.
123. See C. ROSSITER, supra note 81, at 287 (Debates at Pennsylvania convention "changed not
a single mind.").
124. 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 76, at 25; see also W. BERNS, supra note 68, at 117 ("[lilt
was the people on whose judgment everything ultimately depended.").
125. As Kurland and Lerner point out, "Being utterly dependent on the chance survival of
arguments committed to paper, we are left in the dark concerning whatever else was thought but not
said, said but not written, written but not saved, saved but not found." 1 P. KURLAND & &
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they discarded as chaff. And, alas, no enterprising journalists conducted
exit polls to determine the voters' attitudes, as distinguished from the
views of the propagandists seeking to influence them. How then are we
to ensure that we do not overlook the People's intent?
5. The Federalist Papers and Other Pamphlets
We have alluded to the flood of propaganda favoring and opposing
ratification directed at the American public and the delegates to the state
ratifying conventions. A cursory review of the briefs filed in the original
intent cases subject to this Case Management Order shows that The Fed-
eralist Papers is most frequently cited. We are concerned that exponents
of the Jurisprudence of Original Intent may have overstated the influence
of this single source on the ratifiers and the voters who selected them.
We are aware, of course, of the distinction of The Federalist Papers, well
summarized by Professor Rossiter's encomium:
This work has always commanded widespread respect as the first
and still most authoritative commentary on the Constitution of the
United States. It has been searched minutely by lawyers for its analysis
of the powers of Congress, quoted confidently by historians for its revela-
tions of the hopes and fears of the framers of the Constitution, and cited
magisterially by the Supreme Court for its arguments on behalf of judi-
cial review, executive independence, and national supremacy. It would
not be stretching the truth more than a few inches to say that The Feder-
alist stands third only to the Declaration of Independence and the Con-
stitution itself among all the sacred writings of American political
history.
12 6
This court is not given to iconoclasm. Nonetheless, no matter how
sacred The Federalist may be, we cannot allow ourselves to be overawed
by it. For this reason, we request counsel to advise us about the issues
discussed below, issues stimulated by the tendency of advocates in consti-
tutional cases to quote extracts from The Federalist Papers as all but con-
clusive evidence of the founders' intent.
First, The Federalist Papers were not written after ratification, but
during the ratification battle. Furthermore, they were addressed to the
people of New York in an "endeavor to give a satisfactory answer to all
the objections [to the draft Constitution] which shall have made their
appearance, that may seem to have any claim to your attention." 127
Thus, even if The Federalist Papers reflected the views of some of the
LERNER, supra note 55, at xi. For a monumental collection of seemingly 'ephemeral material that
did survive and was found, see I DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 91.
126. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS at vii (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). For early judicial citations to The
Federalist, see Pierson, The Federalist in the Supreme Court, 33 YALE L.J. 728, 734-35 (1924).
127. THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 36 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
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Philadelphia framers, it cannot be taken as a report of what was intended
by the ratifiers who had not yet voted.
Second, some advocates-perhaps implicitly conceding point one-
link The Federalist Papers and the intent of the ratifiers together with a
cause-and-effect argument that, as we understand it, runs as follows:
1. To induce ratification, The Federalist Papers assured the ratifiers
that a particular provision of the proposed Constitution meant this or
that.
2. This assurance was not an argument, but a representation.
3. Relying on this representation, the ratifiers voted in favor of
adoption.
4. The ratifiers' original intent was, therefore, to endorse the mean-
ing ascribed to the provision by The Federalist Papers.
5. Consequently, the Jurisprudence of Original Intent requires the
courts to give effect to the ascribed meaning of the particular provision,
lest they commit a fraud on the ratifiers. 28
On brooding about this interpretive strategy, we are struck by its
protagonists' failure to offer evidence supporting step three in the argu-
ment. This step, necessary to convert the assurances in The Federalist
Papers into representations that induced action, conflates, in our opinion,
three premises. These premises are: (a) that the assurances in The Feder-
alist Papers came to the attention of a significant number of ratifiers; (b)
that the representation induced some previously opposed or undecided
ratifiers to vote in favor of ratification; and (c) that these converts repre-
sented a critical mass whose votes were essential to victory.
We invite counsel to discuss whether we should require a factual
showing in support of each of these sub-steps, as a condition to accepting
the assurance-representation-fraud theory. In this connection, we call
counsel's attention to Professor Rossiter's verdict on the influence of The
Federalist:
The Federalist worked only a small influence upon the course of
events during the struggle over ratification. Promises, threats, bargains,
and face-to-face debates, not eloquent words in even the most widely
128. Berger may have inspired this interpretative strategy. He argued:
Construction of both the commerce and general welfare clauses should proceed from
Madison's assurances in the Federalist. The federal jurisdiction, he stated in No. 39,
"extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the States a residuary and
inviolable sovereignty over all other objects." Particularizing in No. 45, he said federal
power "will be exercised principally on external objects as war, ,peace, negotiations and
foreign commerce... The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all objects
which . . . concern . . . the internal order . . . of the State." To repudiate such
representations to the Ratifiers is, as Story wrote, to commit a fraud upon the American
people.
R. BERGER, FEDERALISM, supra note 17, at 152 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). For
other assertions by Berger that statements in The Federalist Papers were "assurances" to the ratifiers,
see id. at 14, 32-33, 63, 70-71, 101-02, 111.
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circulated newspapers, won hard-earned victories for the Constitution in
the crucial states of Massachusetts, Virginia, and New York.... The
chief usefulness of The Federalist in the events of 1788 was as a kind of
debater's handbook in Virginia and New York. Copies of the collected
edition were rushed to Richmond at Hamilton's direction and used grate-
fully by advocates of the Constitution in the climactic debate over
ratification. 129
In responding to our request, counsel should bear in mind that the nine
states required for ratification had acted favorably before Virginia's "cli-
mactic debate over ratification" was resolved. Also, counsel should con-
sider that a recent study of the ratification debate in New York, which
was also a laggard state, concludes that "[d]espite the significant place
The Federalist has assumed in American political thought, its impact on
New York's reception of the Constitution was negligible."'
130
We recognize how heavy the burden of proof will be if we insist
upon evidence that the assurances in The Federalist Papers had the effects
described by sub-steps (a) through (c) of step three. However, without
such evidence, should we indulge in an irrebuttable presumption that
every such assurance was, by itself, a sine qua non of ratification? One
commentator has suggested 131 that such a presumption would be tanta-
mount to an order by the Librarian of Congress requiring the following
warning to be affixed to all copies of The Federalist Papers:
RATIFIERS, READ THIS WORK AT
YOUR PERIL
Take notice, that if the Constitution is ratified and
you desire thereafter an authentic exposition of your own
as-yet-unformed original intent,
YOU WILL HAVE TO READ THIS
WORK AGAINI
The proposed warning may be a flight of fancy, but it is propelled by a
serious idea, which counsel should discuss, viz., whether such an irrebut-
table presumption is warranted.
Third, assuming arguendo that we can properly treat The Federalist
129. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 126, at xi.
130. Kaminski, New York The Reluctant Pillar, in THE RELUCTANT PILLAR: NEW YORK AND
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 71-72 (S. Schechter ed. 1985).
131. See Bittker, The Bicentennial of the Jurisprudence of Original Intent, 77 CALIF. L. REV.
235, 272 n.131 (1989).
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Papers as an authoritative guide to the meaning of the Constitution as
understood and intended by the founders, we are troubled by a problem
of chronology. The Federalist Papers were issued in eighty-five install-
ments, starting before the Constitution was ratified by Delaware, the first
state to act, and ending shortly after it was ratified by South Carolina,
the eighth state to act. Our problem is illustrated by the assertion in
several of the briefs in cases covered by this Case Management Order
that "the Ratifiers were assured by Federalist No. 83" that the jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts was confined to a certain area and that "conse-
quently the Constitution excludes cases outside this area." '132 Since eight
of the requisite nine states had already acted before Federalist No. 83 was
published, we request counsel to discuss whether its assurance can be
properly imputed to the early birds. If the assurances cannot be imputed,
are we faced with the possibility that the ratifiers acted on different, pos-
sibly even on conflicting, assumptions about the meaning of the provision
discussed by Federalist No. 83?
It may be thought that this is a freak issue, arising only because No.
83 was one of the last Federalist Papers to be published. However, we
direct counsel's attention to the disturbing fact that five of the requisite
nine states had ratified the Constitution by January 9, 1788, when sub-
stantially more than half of The Federalist Papers had not yet seen the
light of day.
In short, when interpreting the Constitution, should we disregard
(1) the early Federalist Papers because they appeared too early to reflect
the intent of the late ratifiers, and (2) the late Federalist Papers because
they appeared too late to influence the early ratifiers?
6. Were the "Framers" Individuals or States?
A final point. The original intent briefs that have come to our atten-
tion assume, without discussion or explanation, that the framers whose
intent is controlling were the individuals who participated in making the
Constitution. Counsel should remember, however, that the states
selected the delegates to the Philadelphia Convention, that the Conven-
tion transmitted its handiwork back to the states, that article VII requires
ratification by state conventions, and that the states determined the
number and method of selecting the ratifiers. Was, then, the Constitu-
tion framed by the ratifying states rather than by their nominees and
132. These assertions seem to be paraphrases of Berger, who stated,
As Hamilton assured the Ratifiers [in Federalist No. 83], judicial authority was confined
to "certain cases particularly specified The expression of those cases marks the precise
limits beyond which the federal courts cannot extend their jurisdiction." Consequently,
jurisdiction of cases "arising under" the Constitution impliedly excludes cases that do not
arise thereunder.
K. BERGER, FEDERALISM, supra note 17, at 14 (footnotes omitted; emphasis added by Berger).
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agents? If so, and if there were one hundred delegates at State A's
ratification convention but only eleven at State B's, should we accord no
more weight to the intent of all A's delegates than to the intent of State
B's eleven delegates? In short, should we count corporate, not individ-
ual, noses?
We request, accordingly, that the Special Master instruct counsel to
advise us whether the framers of the Constitution were the states, rather
than the individuals through whom the states acted. If so, how should
we ascertain the intent of these incorporeal bodies?
C. The Role of Stare Decisis
Most of the briefs in the avalanche of original intent cases that
prompted this Case Management Order seem to accept the conventional
theory that stare decisis rarely, if ever, protects earlier constitutional
decisions from reexamination. Thus, the briefs attack and defend a host
of judicial landmarks on the assumption that no matter how ancient a
doctrine of constitutional law may be, it must stand or fall on its intrinsic
merits. In denying "squatter sovereignty" to earlier decisions, 133 these
briefs are consistent with the views Chief Justice Taney expressed in 1849
when dissenting in the Passenger Cases.134  There, he cited several
Supreme Court decisions supporting his position, but then pointedly
refrained from claiming that the doctrine of stare decisis immunized
them against reexamination. Instead, he announced:
I ... am quite willing that it be regarded hereafter as the law of this
court, that its opinion upon the construction of the Constitution is always
open to discussion when it is supposed to have been founded in error, and
that its judicial authority should hereafter depend altogether on the force
of the reasoning by which it is supported. 13 5
Justice Brandeis subsequently supplied Taney's concession with both rea-
sons and modem trappings:
Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more
important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled
right. This is commonly true even where the error is a matter of serious
concern, provided correction can be had by legislation. But in cases
involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative
action is practically impossible, this Court has often overruled its earlier
decisions. The Court bows to the lessons of experience and the force of
133. See Berger, Some Reflections on Interpretivism, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 15 (1986) ("No
doctrine of judicial squatter sovereignty may run against the Constitution.").
134. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
135. Id. at 470 (Taney, C.J., dissenting). For a characteristically pithy comment to the same
effect, in a case involving statutory construction, see Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Henslee v.
Union Planters Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949) ("Wisdom too often never comes,
and so one ought not to reject it merely because it comes late.").
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better reasoning, recognizing that the process of trial and error, so
fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial
function. 13
6
Stare decisis so feebly constrains the reexamination of constitutional
issues that the court sometimes fails even to mention the doctrine when a
long-standing earlier case is overruled. 137 The dissenters in these over-
ruling cases have implicitly conceded the irrelevance of stare decisis by
focusing on the merits of the earlier decision. The dissenters apparently
agree with Chief Justice Taney that the "judicial authority [of such a
decision] should.., depend altogether on the force of the reasoning by
which it is supported."' 38
To be sure, stare decisis is not wholly without protagonists in consti-
tutional litigation. Sometimes these protagonists quote Justice Roberts'
arresting objection in 1944 to the Court's decision to overrule a nine-
year-old decision in which he had spoken for a unanimous Court:
I believe it will not be gainsaid the [overruled] case received the
attention and consideration which the questions involved demanded and
the opinion represented the views of all the justices. It appears that those
views do not now commend themselves to the court. ... Their sound-
ness, however, is not a matter which presently concerns me.
The reason for my concern is that the instant decision, overruling
that announced about nine years ago, tends to bring adjudications of this
tribunal into the same class as a restricted railroad ticket, good for this
day and train only. I have no assurance, in view of current decisions,
that the opinion announced today may not shortly be repudiated and
overruled by justices who deem they have new light on the subject.' 39
Despite Justice Roberts' disclaimer of concern for the soundness of
the overruled decision, his implicit invocation of stare decisis would have
been more impressive had he invoked it to bless and preserve an earlier
constitutional decision that he thought was both unsound and beyond
legislative correction. Perhaps Justice Roberts would have been pre-
136. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-08 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(footnotes listing numerous cases that the Court later qualified or overruled, omitted); see also
United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 101 (1978) (endorsing Brandeis' comments).
137. See, eg., South Carolina v. Baker, 108 S. Ct. 1355, 1365-67 (1988) (overruling Pollock v.
Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895)); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528, 557 (1985) (overruling National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)); United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115-17 (1941) (overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251
(1918)); see also Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 108 S. Ct. 2117, 2121 (1988) (reexamining and endorsing
150-year-old precedent on the merits, without mentioning stare decisis).
138. Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 470 (Taney, C.J., dissenting); see also Baker, 108 S.
Ct. at 1370 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
139. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 668-69 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (overruling
Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935)). Query whether the last sentence of this extract implies
that if the Court had reconsidered Smith v. Allwright during Justice Roberts' incumbency, he would
have applied the doctrine of stare decisis to it, or to Grovey v. Townsend.
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pared to achieve "consistency in adjudication"'140 by systematically
perpetuating earlier decisions that, by his lights, were devoid of constitu-
tional legitimacy. If so, however, it is doubtful that he would have had
many fellow travelers.
In light of this discussion, it is surprising to find that some of the
most sedulous proponents of the Jurisprudence of Original Intent do not
always rejoice at the Supreme Court's traditional willingness to overrule
constitutional decisions that are "founded in error." '41 Instead, they
have suggested that some targets of their withering criticism might be
preserved, though perhaps only after these cases have been officially
branded as the product of judicial tyranny and thus sterilized against
metastasizing. Judge Bork, for example, has asserted that "a judge with
an original intent philosophy... needs a strong theory of precedent to
keep from getting back into matters that are long settled, even if incor-
rectly settled."' 142 Without describing his theory of stare decisis in detail,
he illustrated its results as follows:
This Nation has grown in ways that do not comport with the inten-
tions of the people who wrote the Constitution-the commerce clause is
one example-and it is simply too late to go back and tear that up.
I cite to you the legal tender cases. These are extreme examples
admittedly. Scholarship suggests that the Framers intended to prohibit
paper money. Any judge who today thought he would go back to the
original intent really ought to be accompanied by a guardian rather than
be sitting on a bench. 143
Judge Bork also cited Shelley v. Kraemer1" as a case to be left
alone, not because it has become an ineradicable part of the nation's
institutions, but for the opposite reason. He stated,
In fact, Shelley against Kraemer has never been applied again. It has had
no generative force. It has not proved to be a precedent. As such, it is
not a case to be reconsidered. It did what it did; it adopted a principle
which the Court has never adopted again. And while I criticized the case
at the time, it is not a case worth reconsidering. 145
Although Raoul Berger has not explicitly endorsed Judge Bork's
140. Id at 670 (Roberts, J. dissenting).
141. Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 4700 (Taney, C.J., dissenting).
142. Hearings Before Senate Comm. on the Judiciary 100th Cong., 1st Ses Nomination of
Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Part 1 at 159
(1987) [hereinafter Hearings]. Foreshadowing this comment, Judge Bork's prepared introductory
statement observed that "[r]espect for precedent is a part of the great tradition of our law, just as is
fidelity to the intent of those who ratified the Constitution and enacted our statutes." Id, at 76.
143. Id at 84-85; see also Oaks, Judicial Activism, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PO-'Y 1, 10 (1984)
("On the subject of stare decisis, it is remarkable that so few interpretivists grapple with how to
square improvements in theory with the reality of public expectations and the constraints of stare
decisis.").
144. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
145. Hearings; supra note 142, at 86.
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view, he has similarly conceded that not all decisions flouting the fram-
ers' original intent need be extirpated:
Intellectual honesty... constrains me to be prepared to overrule all deci-
sions that departed from the original design ....
But while decisions can be overruled, past events are not so easily
undone. Like poured concrete, they have hardened, so that overruling
decisions cannot restore the status quo ante.... But to accept uner-
asable ends on practical grounds is not to condone continued employment
of unlawful means. The practical difficulty of a rollback cannot excuse
the continuation, the ever-expanding resort to such unconstitutional prac-
tices. "Go and sin no more" does not signify acceptance of illegitimate
acts, but counsels, rather, do not continue to apply unconstitutional doc-
trine in ever-expanding fashion. 1
46
Applying the Biblical injunction to "go and sin no more" to Brown v.
Board of Education, Berger acknowledges that "blacks cannot be forced
back into a ghetto," but he would halt "court-administered schools and
prisons, affirmative action, busing, and the like."' 47
Although these suggestions contain an unarticulated premise that
the courts can properly perpetuate decisions violating the framers' intent,
we know of no evidence that the framers intended this result. This is
particularly true since the doctrine of stare decisis "has always been a
doctrine of convenience," the application of which is "entirely within the
discretion of the Court" since it is "inherently subjective."' 48 Does stare
146. R. BERGER, FEDERALISM, supra note 17, at 179-80 (emphasis in original) (footnotes
omitted); see also Berger, Michael Perry's Functional Justification for Judicial Activism, 8 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 465, 486-87 (1983). If we understand him correctly, however, Berger would have
the courts overrule, root and branch, Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) (forbidding
summary judicial punishment of publications preventing the proper discharge of judicial functions);
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (judicially ordered reapportionment); Williams v. Florida, 361
U.S. 847 (1959) (12-person jury requirement); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right of
indigent migrants to welfare payments upon arrival in a destination state); and the death penalty
cases, Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (death
penalty for accomplice to murder and rape, respectively, violates the eighth amendments
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment). See R. BERGER, SELECTED WRITINGS ON THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 18, at 266-74. Butcf Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 353, 382 (1981) ("Stare decisis would, perhaps, perpetuate the core of the court's nontextually
based holdings: the privacy-autonomy-equality holdings in the sex-marriage-children area.");
Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 MD. L. REV. 1, 7 (1979) (Reappointment
principle is "far too deeply embedded in the constitutional order to admit of reassessment.").
147. R. BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES, supra note 17, at 83 n.29. Berger has similarly stated:
This is not the place to essay the massive task of furnishing a blueprint for a rollback.
But the judges might begin by curbing their reach for still more policymaking power, by
withdrawing from extreme measures such as administration of school systems-
government by decree--which have disquieted even sympathizers with the ultimate
objectives [of the desegregation decisions].
R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 17, at 413.
148. Cooper, Stare Decisis: Precedent and Principle in ConstitutionalAdjudication 73 CORNELL
L. REV. 401, 402, 403 n.11, 404 (1988); see also Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 212 (1910)
(whether to follow stare decisis is "a question entirely within the discretion of the court"); cf
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decisis possess a backbone, or was it doomed at birth to suffer from the
same incurable indeterminacy that originalists attribute to the positions
propounded by their rivals? If we are to eschew judicial lawmaking, a
prime objective of the Jurisprudence of Original Intent, can we properly
employ an inherently subjective and entirely discretionary doctrine in
deciding whether to preserve or overrule erroneous constitutional
decisions?
Perhaps counsel can rescue us from this peril. We request the Spe-
cial Master to coordinate a systematic exploration of the relationship
between stare decisis and the fate of constitutional decisions that, in our
view, cannot be reconciled with the framers' intent. The analysis should
encompass, but not necessarily be limited to, the following issues:
1. Should the courts refuse to overrule constitutional decisions that
flout the framers' intent if, as one thoughtful commentator has argued,
correcting the error would trigger "massive destabilization ... [that]
would threaten the functioning of the federal government"? 149 Or, to the
contrary, are these precisely the cases that should be at the top of the
judicial corrective agenda? It is often stated that these decisions, though
illegitimate, have produced results that are indispensable to the orderly
functioning of our political order, the usual candidates for this accolade
being Brown v. Board of Education and the Legal Tender Cases.150 If
that is true, cannot the courts confidently anticipate that legislation or a
Constitutional amendment will promptly restore the status quo ante?
Conversely, if we believe that Congress alone or Congress and three-
quarters of the state legislatures, as the case may be, will refuse to restore
the status quo ante, should we not then conclude that judicial correction
of the error will not destabilize our constitutional order? Would not
invoking stare decisis in these circumstances be merely a euphemism for
judicial lawmaking? Of course, we intimate no answers to these ques-
tions, and will not do so before hearing from counsel.
2. If counsel urges us to perpetuate otherwise indefensible deci-
sions lest we "threaten the functioning of the federal government,"' -"
how should we determine whether particular decisions qualify for immu-
nity on this ground? Should a Congressional declaration of necessity be
accepted as persuasive, or even as conclusive? Should we hear expert
testimony, with or without the aid of a jury? Should we rely on our
collective experience and judgment? If so, will we be perceived as
kadis' 52 -kadis who sit on a bench in a court house rather than under a
Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 422, 422 (1988)
("[N]o one has a principled theory [of stare decisis] to offer").
149. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 723, 750
(1988).
150. See, eg., Dam, The Legal Tender Cases, 1981 Sup. Cr. REv. 367, 389 ("difficult to escape
the conclusion that the Framers intended to prohibit" use of paper money as legal tender).
151. Monaghan, supra note 149, at 750.
152. See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 11 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("This is a
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tree in the open air, to be sure, but kadis nevertheless?
3. Turning from momentous decisions flouting the framers' intent
to "small" decisions that suffer from the same defect, should they be pre-
served in order "to demonstrate-at least to elites-the continuing legiti-
macy of judicial review?"' 5 3 Is it "perverse to defend the idea that the
[Supreme] Court maintains its subservience to the fundamental law by
upholding decisions that depart from that law?' 154 Or, to the contrary,
is this an appropriate way "of maintaining public faith in the judiciary as
a source of impersonal and reasoned judgments," as Justice Harlan
observed in an analysis of the "[v]ery weighty considerations" underlying
the doctrine of stare decisis? 155 In all candor, we hope that counsel can
help us separate those decisions that we can safely overrule without
impairing public confidence in the rule of law from those that we should
preserve in the interest of stability. In appealing for assistance, we do not
preclude counsel from arguing that picking and choosing among deci-
sions would be ineluctably discretionary and that we would best serve
public confidence by according immunity either to all prior constitu-
tional decisions or to none.
4. Assuming that some constitutionally incorrect decisions are to
be preserved, we request counsel to discuss whether we should confine
the otherwise unacceptable decision to its facts, or accord it more gener-
ous treatment. For example, assume that we conclude, contrary to Wick-
ard v. Filburn, 156 that the power of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce does not authorize the Department of Agriculture to impose
penalties on farmers who exceed their allotted marketing quota by raising
excess wheat for family consumption. We might decide that, for exam-
ple, the impact of home-consumed produce on interstate commerce is too
insubstantial or, more broadly, that Congress is authorized only to regu-
late state-imposed restrictions on interstate commerce.15 7 If stare decisis
is to shield this decision despite our disagreement with its reasoning and
conclusion, should we continue to apply it even if Congress significantly
changes the underlying statute by tripling the penalty or adding a crimi-
nal sanction, for example? In the same vein, should we subject other
persons and businesses to analogous federal laws (for example, miners
who extract excess minerals or banks with excess branches) if we believe
court of review, not a tribunal unbounded by rules. We do not sit like a kadi under a tree dispensing
justice according to considerations of individual expediency.").
153. Monaghan, supra note 149, at 752.
154. Id.
155. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970). Following this analysis, Justice
Harlan, speaking for a unanimous court, overruled a prior decision because such reconsideration
could not be "as threatening to public faith in the judiciary as continued adherence to a rule
unjustified in reason." Id. at 405.
156. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). For criticism of this case for departing from the framers' intent, see
R. BERGER, FEDERALISM, supra note 17, at 148-51.
157. For a similar analysis, see the discussion of the Interstate Monopoly Case, supra section
II.A. and text accompanying notes 21-29.
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that the Court that decided Wickard v. Filburn would have applied its
rationale to these activities?
5. Should we apply a principle of repose to judicial assumptions
about the meaning of the Constitution that have been long accepted but
never explicitly endorsed by the courts if those assumptions are, in our
view, inconsistent with the framers' intent? The Corporate Due Process
Case 158 illustrates our quandary. The right of corporations to proce-
dural due process was so entrenched in the conventional legal wisdom,
even though no decision explicitly endorsed this right, that the issue was
"off the agenda" 159 for more than two centuries.
If lawyers believed for so many decades that they could not possibly
challenge these assumptions successfully, should we treat them as
equivalent to judicial decisions in applying the doctrine of stare decisis?
6. Finally, we request counsel to supply any evidence that they can
find on the framers' intent with respect to the foregoing issues. Accord-
ingly, we remind counsel: (1) that Chief Justice Taney accepted the prin-
ciple that the "judicial authority" of the Supreme Court's prior
interpretations of the Constitution "should hereafter depend altogether
on the force of the reasoning by which it is supported"; 1" (2) that stare
decisis has been characterized as an inherently subjective and entirely
discretionary doctrine; and (3) that the Jurisprudence of Original Intent
teaches that nothing can be more subversive of a written Constitution
than judicial policymaking.
Author's Postscript
While this Article was being edited for publication, the march of
events made a postscript necessary.
On accepting appointment under Case Management Order No. 1,
the Special Master engaged the leading academic expert on the framing
of the Constitution to collate and analyze the material submitted by
counsel. The consultant's initial report was, in the Special Master's
words, a "model of dispassionate scholarship," and a treasury check in
payment for his services was promptly issued. The consultant, however,
refused to cash the check. He asserted that he could not be required to
accept as legal tender the Federal Reserve notes that would be proferred
by the drawee bank upon presentation of the check. To justify this aston-
ishing claim, he submitted to the Special Master an extended memoran-
dum, which concluded that the Supreme Court's decision in the Legal
Tender Cases, legitimizing paper money, violated the original intent of
158. See supra section II.C.; text accompanying notes 57-67.
159. For this phrase, see Monaghan, supra note 149, at 744 ("Many constitutional issues are so
far settled that they are simply off the agenda.").
160. Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 470 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting).
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the framers.' 61
The Special Master urged the consultant to reconsider his refusal to
cash the check. The Special Master argued that the consultant, like
other citizens, routinely receives and pays out paper money in his daily
life. But the consultant rejected this appeal, arguing that he could not
accept "unconstitutional scraps of paper" as compensation for his official
services as the Master's Consultant on the framers' original intent.
The Special Master thought that this stand was quixotic at best and
self-righteous at worst, but soon discovered not only that the consultant
would not budge, but also that he would perform no more services until
he received "constitutional" compensation for his initial report. More-
over, firing the consultant was no answer to the problem. When the Spe-
cial Master sounded out other qualified academic experts, they all
indignantly asserted that they would not even consider filling a vacancy
created by discharging their high-minded colleague for adhering to
principle. 162
Concluding that she could not move ahead with her assignment,
either with the consultant or without him, the Special Master referred
her dilemma to the Special Panel. She recommended that the Panel cer-
tify the following question to the Court: "Can the doctrine of the Legal
Tender Cases be reconciled with the Jurisprudence of Original Intent?"
The Special Master assumed that an affirmative answer to this question
would induce the consultant to change his mind, while a negative answer
would induce the Treasury to pay him in gold coin. The Special Panel
quickly certified the question as recommended.
The Supreme Court, almost as quickly, referred the matter back to
the Special Panel, instructing it to explore whether the framers contem-
plated that "[tlhe judicial Power of the United States," as created by the
Constitution, 63 would authorize the courts to render advisory opinions.
In remanding, the Court noted that it had refused as early as 1793 to
express opinions on legal issues in the absence of a justiciable case or
controversy. 64 The Court added that the 1793 precedent antedated by
three years the first explicit reference in an opinion to the framers' origi-
nal intent. 65 The Special Panel inferred from this otherwise irrelevant
161. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871). For background, see 6 C. FAIRMAN,
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, ch. 14, at 677-774 (1971); see also
supra note 150.
162. The author regrets that he has not been able either to confirm or to disprove rumors in
academic circles that the consultant and his colleagues are covert surviving members of the "non-
interpretivist" school of constitutional exegesis, seeking to trash the Special Master's work.
163. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
164. For advisory opinions, see generally P. BATOR, D. MELTZER, P. MISHIN, D. SHAPRIo,
HART & WEcHsLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 65-72 (3d ed. 1988);
Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 247-50 (1988).
165. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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detail of chronology that the Court might be willing to answer the certi-
fied question if advisory opinions could be squared with the Jurispru-
dence of Original Intent. The Special Panel subsequently directed the
Special Master to report on this issue. She, in turn, called in the consult-
ant, hopeful that the log-jam could now be broken.
The consultant, alas, would not rise above principle. He refused to
perform any services, not even to investigate the constitutionality of advi-
sory opinions, until he was paid for the work already completed.
Though the Special Master and Special Panel are legally authorized
to proceed without the advice of the consultant, they are loath to do so,
fearing that their impartiality will be questioned if they depart from pro-
cedures that they themselves created to ensure a searching and objective
inquiry into politically charged issues. The result, in short, is that the
current constitutional validity of the Legal Tender Cases cannot be set-
tled without an advisory opinion from the Supreme Court, and that such
an opinion cannot be obtained unless and until the status of the Legal
Tender Cases is resolved.
As this goes to press, the log-jam is intact. Watch your electronic
bulletin boards for future developments.
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